ORIGIN AND DOCTRINES

OF

EARLY INDIAN BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

A TRANSLATION OF THE HSÜAN-CHWANG VERSION OF

VASUMITRA'S TREATISE

TRANSLATED WITH ANNOTATIONS

BY

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. B. = After Buddha.
Ch'en-lun = Pu'-ʿchi-i-lun, translated by Paramārtha. (Cf. p. 6.)
Ch'in-lun = ʿShi-pa-pu'-lun. (Cf. p. 5.)
Childers = Childers, Pāli-English Dictionary. 4th impression. London 1909.
Eitel = Eitel, Handbook for the Student of Chinese Buddhism. London 1870.
E. R. E. = Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religions and Ethics.
ˌFa-jên = I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-ʿshu-chi-ˌfa-jên. (Cf. p. 10, note 2.)
J. R. A. S. = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.
Mah. v. = Mahāvyutpatti. Bibliotheca Buddhica XIII. Petersburg 1911.
Nanjio = Nanjio, B, A Catalogue of the Chinese translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka. London 1883.
S. E. K. E. = Kyoto supplementary edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka. (1905—1912.)
ʿShu-chi = I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-ʿshu-chi. (Cf. p. 10, note 2.)
T'ang-lun = I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun, translated by Hsüan-chwang. (Cf. p. 6.)
Tāranātha = Tāranātha, Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien. Translated by A. Schiefner. Petersburg 1869.
T. E. = Tokio edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka (1880—1885).
Wassiljew = Wassiljew, Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur. Translated by A. Schiefner. Petersburg 1860.

PREFACE

The Chinese has preserved three versions of an important treatise on the early Indian Buddhist schools which is ascribed to Vasumitra. The first version is called the 'Shi-pa-pu'-lun (十八部論) or "a treatise on the eighteen schools."[1] By some authorities[2] the translating of this first version is ascribed to Kumārajīva (401—413 A. D.) while by others to Paramārtha (546—569 A. D.).[3] But both ascriptions seem subject to doubt. As pointed out in the Kai-yüan-lu[4] (730 A. D.) this version consists of the fifteenth section of the Mañjuśrī-paripṛcchā-sūtra[5] which is rendered by Saṃghapāla in 518 A. D. and the so-called "collection" of Kumārajīva. This fact assures at once the untenability of ascribing the translating of the first Chinese version to Paramārtha. Moreover, when we compare this version with the Pu'-'chï-i-lun (Cf. infra) or the so-called second translation of Paramārtha we find considerable differences between them which confirm us the untenability of ascribing it to Paramārtha. Then, is this, (I am now speaking of the second part of this version) a translation by Kumārajīva? Chi-ts'-ang[6] (549—623 A. D.) and others are inclined to give a positive answer to this question. Our survey, however, of

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1 T. E. XXIV, 4, p. 78a—80a.

2 Cf. note 6.

3 In the Li'-tai-san-pao-chi (Nanjio, 1504) which was compiled by Fai Chang-fang (費長房) in 597 A. D. the first version of our text is mentioned as among the works of Paramārtha. Cf. T. E. XXXV, 6, p. 76b.

In the Tokio Edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka the translator of this first version is given as Paramārtha.

4 T. E. XXXVIII, 4, p. 121 b.

5 Nanjio, 442.

6 A well-known Chinese writer on the Madhyamaka texts. In one of his works, namely the san-lun-hsüan-i (Cat. S. E. K. E., 860) he speaks of Kumārajīva's treatise on the schools (分別部論). This treatise which is spoken of by Chi-ts'ang is interpreted by a certain authority to mean the first version of Vasumitra's treatise prepared by Kumārajīva.

The compiler of the Fa-jên is also inclined to believe that the first version was made by Kumārajīva. Cf. Fa-jên I, p. 1a.

the catalogues of Chinese Buddhist literature fails to afford us any evidence to support this positive answer. Though we have several reasons to believe that the present version was made under the Ch'in dynasty[1] (351—431 A. D.) yet it seems hazardous to ascribe the translatorship to Kumārajiva. On this point the view of the Kai-yüan-lu[2] seems plausible enough. According to it this version is the first Chinese translation of Vasumitra's treatise which was made under the Ch'in dynasty; but the name of the translator is lost. This version is referred to in the present work as the Ch'in-lun in accordance with the old usage.

The second version is called the Pu'-chi-i-lun (部執異論) or "a treatise on the differences of the views of the schools."[3] This is a translation which was made by Paramārtha (546—569 A. D.) of the Ch'en dynasty (557—568). Paramārtha was an Indian who was well-versed in the Abhidharma works. Therefore his translation is more accurate than the first. It is a matter of great regret that the commentary which was prepared by him on his translation in ten fasciculi is lost. This second version is referred to in the present work under the old abbreviated title of the Ch'en-lun.

The third version is that which is prepared by Hsüan-chwang in 662 A. D. and which is known under the name of I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun (異部宗輪論) or "a treatise (called) the wheel of the doctrines of different schools."[4] It is this version, the best of all the versions, which is translated here in comparison with the above two versions. Because this version was made under the T'ang dynasty (618—962 A. D.) it is spoken of as the T'ang-lun.

It is a matter of congratulation that the Tibetan also has preserved a version. It was translated by Dharmākara and is known under the title of གཞུང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་བཀོད་པའི་འཁོར་ལོ.[5] Evidently this is the equivalent of the Sanskrit title samaya-bhedo 'paracana-cakra or "the wheel of statements (lit. arrangement) of the dissensions of doctrines."[6]

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1 We find the following note in this version: "Sthavira means the school (of the people) who sit above, *i. e.*, elders) in the word of Ch'in." T. E. XXIV, 4, p. 78b.

2 Cf. p. 5, note 4.

3 T. E. XXIV, 4, p. 80b—82b.

4 T. E. XXIV, 4, p. 76a—78a.

5 Bstan-bgyur ཉུ, 168b, 7—176b, 8. Cf. Cordier III, p. 414.

6 Wassiljew's restoration and translation of this title seem quite inaccurate. Cf. Wassiljew, p. 244, note 1.

Wassiljew has translated this version into Russian and embodied it in his "Buddhism" as the second appendix.[1]

The authorship of our text itself is unanimously, both in the Chinese and Tibetan sources, ascribed to Vasumitra. On this point it seems hardly necessary to raise any doubt. The point which is to be investigated in this connection is the date of our author. According to the ˛Fa-jên[2] there are, as far as the Buddhist Chinese literature is concerned, five Vasumitras;[3] viz.:

1. The Vasumitra who appeared at the beginning of the third century after the death of the Buddha and who is the author of the prakaraṇa-pāda- and dhātu-kāya-pāda-śāstra.[4]

2. The Vasumitra in the fourth century after the Buddha. He was one of the four great Sthaviras at the time of the compilation of the Mahāvibhāṣā in the reign of King Kaniṣka.

3. The Vasumitra of the Sautrāntika school who taught a theory that even in the abstract meditation which is called extinction (nirodhasamāpatti) there is a subtle mind.

4. The Vasumitra who appeared a thousand years after the Buddha and whose name is given in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra.

5. The Vasumitra from whom Hsüan-chwang has learned the doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda school in Kashmir.

Which among these five Vasumitras is the author of our text? Most Chinese scholars, beginning with K'wei-chi[5] (632—682 A. D.)

1 Wassiljew: Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur. Übersetzt von A. Schiefner, Petersburg 1860, p. 244—284.

2 ˛Fa-jên I, p. 1b.

3 Minayeff also enumerates five Vasumitras based on Tāranātha. They are:

1. the Vasumitra who lived at the time of Kaniṣka,

2. the Vasumitra who emigrated to a country neighbouring to Tokhara accompanied by Goṣaka,

3. the famous scholar of the Vaibhāṣika school,

4. the author of the Abhidarmaśāstraprakaraṇa.

5. The author of the commentary on the Abhidharmakośa and also of the work called "wheel showing the differences of the eighteen schools." (Cf. Minayeff. Recherches sur le Bouddhisme, (Annales du Musée Guimet, Tome IV) Paris 1894, p. 196 f.

4 Cf. Takakusu: On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins. London 1905. The table of the seven books of the abhidharma.

5 K'wei-chi writes at the beginning of his commentary as follows:—"The *I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun* is that which was made by *Vasumitra Bodhisattva of the Sarvāstivāda school circa 400 years after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha.*" Cf. the ˊShu-chi I; ˛Fa-jên I, p. 2b.

are convinced that our author is the second in the above list, namely, the Vasumitra in the fourth century after the Buddha, *i. e.*, in the first century B. C. But when we turn to the Tibetan source, *i. e.*, Tāranātha's work, we find that our author is the same Vasumitra who prepared a commentary on the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra.[1] Now the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra is a work of Vasubandhu who lived in the fourth century A. D.[2] If we accept Tāranātha's view, Vasumitra's date must be located at the end of the fourth century A. D. or at the beginning of the fifth century. Is such a location possible? We know already that the first translation of our text appeared some time between 351 and 431 A. D. When we take this fact into consideration, Tāranātha's view seems in no way tenable, as the date of Vasumitra must have been much earlier than the time when his work was translated into Chinese. Moreover the internal evidence of our text betrays a much earlier date. But it does not justify the Chinese tradition of locating Vasumitra in the fourth century after the Buddha, *i. e.*, in the first century B. C. This error arises from the wrong notion about the date of King Kaniṣka. According to modern scientific investigation, Kaniṣka's date is located in the second century A. D.[3] If we can accept the Chinese identification of our author with the Vasumitra who took part in the compilation of the Mahāvibhāṣā, then his date must be located in the second century A. D. and I am inclined to think this location to be quite reasonable. As a careful investigator may easily observe, we have several reasons to believe that the third of the introductory verses of our text, if not all of them, was not composed by Vasumitra himself.[4] The fact that the third verse was a later addition warrants

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1 Tāranātha: Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien. Übersetzt von A. Schiefner, Petersburg 1869, p. 174.

2 According to Takakusu 420—500 while according to Wogihara 390—470. Cf. Winternitz: Geschichte der Indischen Literatur, Bd. II, Leipzig 1920, p. 256.

3 For the latest discussion on this problem cf. Walleser: La data di Nāgārjuna (Alle fonte delle religioni, anno II, num. 2, p. 1—15).

4 There was already a group of scholars at the time of K'wei-chi (632—682 A. D.) who held a view that the composer of all the introductory verses was not Vasumitra (Cf. ʿShu-chi I; ˛Fa-jên I, p. 8a). The present translator also is inclined to believe that at least the third of them is a later interpolation on the following grounds: Firstly it is wanting in the oldest version, namely, in the Ch'in-lun. Secondly no sensible writer will eulogise himself as a great Bodhisattva who is endowed with great wisdom etc., and lastly this verse is not quite in harmony with the preceding and succeeding verses. Cf. p. 12 f., the introductory verses.

the assumption that our text had been current for a considerable length of time in India before it reached the Far East and was rendered into Chinese. It seems to the present translator that Tāranātha's emphatical negation of the identification of our author with the Vasumitra in Kaniṣka's time[1] serves only to show us that the tradition which identifies them had been long current even in Tibet.

The Buddhist literature is immensely rich. There is, however, no so well-written work on the early Buddhist schools in the Buddhist literature, southern and northern, as Vasumitra's treatise. It deals first with the origin of the Buddhist schools, giving the cause and approximate dates of the schisms, and then it narrates the doctrinal propositions of the schools as held in common at the time of the divisions and also the so-called differentiated views among the later sectarians. In this respect our text may be looked upon as a unique one of its kind, though it represents the origin and the doctrines of the schools only from the standpoint of the Sarvāstivāda. As such this work was considered to be the most important of authorities by the scholars of China, Japan and also Tibet.[2] Wassiljew must be complimented on his sagacity in seeing the importance of this work and in translating the Tibetan version with notes into Russian.[3] It is to be regretted, however, that he did not make use of K'wei-chi's learned commentary and also of the super-commentaries which were prepared by several scholars in Japan and that he committed several blunders in translating the Tibetan version. Though Vasumitra's work is insignificant in its size, yet it enumerates in the shortest possible form the salient doctrines of the early schools, each of which once possessed its own vast literature. Owing to its extreme conciseness it is not always easy to grasp its meaning. Fortunately, however, Paramārtha, a learned Indian Buddhist, wrote a commentary on it. Though this commentary is now lost, yet it was utilized by K'wei-chi (d. 682 A. D.) who was an assistant of the translator Hsüan-chwang and who prepared his own commentary in order

In spite of these reasons K'wei-chi is inclined to believe that even the third verse was composed by Vasumitra himself. Cf. ¹Shu-chi I; ˛Fa-jên I, p. 7 b f.

1 Cf. Tāranātha, p. 68.

2 Cf. Tāranātha, p. 174.

3 Cf. Schiefner's German translation: „Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur," p. 244—284.

to obviate the defects of Paramārtha's commentary.[1] It should be noted here that K'wei-chi's commentary is sometimes too succinct. Perhaps it was on this ground that the several super-commentaries were written. In translating the Hsüan-chwang version the present translator has chiefly made use of K'wei-chi's commentary and also of Kenye Oyama's super-commentary (text in Chinese) which are referred to in the present work under the abbreviated titles of the 'Shu-chi and ,Fa-jên respectively.[2]

The other Buddhist literature which has important bearing on the schisms and the doctrines of the early schools are Kathāvatthu, Dīpavaṃsa, Mahāvaṃsa, Sāsanavaṃsa and Milindapañha in Pāli, and nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna by Bhavya, samaya-bhedo 'paracana-cakre (sic) nikāya-bhedo 'padarśana-saṃgraha by Vinītadeva etc. in Tibetan.[3] It goes without saying that all these authorities must be scientifically investigated and compared with Vasumitra in the preparation of ideal notes on Vasumitra's treatise. It was four years ago that the present translator worked out a scheme for the comparative study of these different authorities and began the translation of the Hsüan-chwang version.[4] It is a painful recollection to him now that he could not carry out his scheme on account of the death of his beloved father-in-law and had to leave Calcutta, the place of his appointment, for home. Though the sincere desire of carrying out his original scheme remained ever strong, yet he could find no opportunity to do so, as he was engaged in researches in another field. It is not without a sense of regret that he now has to publish a less elaborate work than the original scheme would have called for.[5]

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1 Cf. 'Shu-chi I; ,Fa-jên I, p. 5b.

2 The full titles of these works are:—

1. *I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi* (異部宗輪論述記) or "the notes on the I-pu'-tsung.lun-lun," (Cat. S. E. K. E. 942).

2. *I-pu'-tsung-lun.lun-'shu-chi-,fa-jên* (異部宗輪論述記發軔) or "the releaser of the hitched car of the *I-pu'-tsung-lun-lun-'shu-chi*.

3 Cf. Cordier III, p. 414—415.

4 Cf. Journal of the department of letters of the Calcutta University. Çalcutta 1920. Vol. I, p. 1—11.

5 The present translator has compared Vasumitra to a certain extent with the Kathāvatthu and other authorities mentioned above. But the results of his comparison are not embodied in the present work as his researches in this respect are incomplete.

It is a matter of regret that he was obliged to curtail the long notes on the historical section of Vasumitra's treatise owing to the limited size of the present contribution.

He has been obliged to prepare this work in a limited period of time. He trusts, however, that it will be a contribution to the scientific study of Buddhism in Europe as he has compared carefully all the versions of Vasumitra's treatise in Chinese and Tibetan and embodied in the notes the results of his research in the Chinese literature, bearing on the doctrines of the early Buddhist schools.

In the preparation of the present rendering the translator has always endeavoured to ascertain what the original sanskrit form would have been. He has then made his translation directly from this imagined original. He has followed this method because the language employed in the Chinese literature on Buddhism is often not the native idiom but an artificially coined means of expression, not to be understood by the employment of ordinary Chinese scholarship. He trusts that by this means he has avoided such blunders as arise from a direct and literal rendering of the Chinese.[1]

In closing this preface the present translator desires to mention his obligation to Professor M. Walleser who was kind enough to lend him the first part of his re-translation of the Tibetan version which is now in the press.

J. Masuda.

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[1] For example 正性離生 has been literally rendered by Wassiljew as „die wahre Natur (erlangen und) sich von den Wiedergeburten befreien." (Cf. Wassiljew, p. 271, note 2.) Such a false rendering as this arises from a failure to call to mind the sanskrit original which must have been samyaktva-nyāma. (Cf. p. 27, note 3.)

SECTION I

INTRODUCTORY VERSES[1]

Since the (Pari-)nirvāṇa of the Śākyan sage,[2]
When a hundred years just did pass,
Schools different there arose in views divine,[3]
And did cause the (decay and) loss.

Due to the different views, one from the other[4]
There did arise then[5] many a school.
According to my own āgama[6] (pure),
(I'll) explain their views, make (them) disliked.

Vasumitra, the great Bodhisattva, endowed
With wisdom great, enlightenment and knowledge (pure)[7]
A Bhikṣu in reality from the Śākyan race,[8]
Looks back to those times and discriminates.[9]

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1 In the original texts there are neither divisions nor headings. For convenience sake the translator has divided the whole text into three main sections, which are again subdivided into many parts.

2 Lit. the Buddha.

3 Lit. the Noble teachings (āryaśāsana) or Buddhism.

4 Paramparabhedābhiniveśāt?

5 Lit. accordingly.

6 Or "the tradition" which was handed down in the Sarvāstivāda school. Vasumitra was a staunch follower of this school.

7 Lit. endowed with great wisdom (智), enlightenment (覺) and knowledge (慧). These three are those attributes which characterize a Bodhisattva. Cf. Shu-chi; Fa-jên I, p. 15.

8 Lit. a Śākyan race (Śākyavaṃsa), a real Bhikṣu.—The Śākyan race, however, does not mean that Vasumitra belonged to the Śākyan race; it means a Śākyaputra.

9 That is to say, he discriminates between the views of the twenty schools, looking back to those times when they arose.

The present verse is undoubtedly a later interpolation, because we cannot believe that the author styled himself a great Bodhisattva etc. Cf. p. 8, note 4.

(When) I (did) observe the worlds all around
Into diverse views (the peoples) drifted (I found),
Split up (the original) words of the Śakyan saint,[1]
(So I 'll) explain their doctrines (as the people meant them).

When the teachings of Buddha closely (I) examine,
Fundamental are the truths āryan (I find),[2]
Like (one) who gathers gold from (heaps of) sand
(Out of untruths) one should pick up the truths.

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[1] Lit. Muni.

[2] Lit. the doctrines of the (four) āryan truths (catvāry ārya-satyāni) are to be relied upon.

SECTION II

DIVISIONS OF EARLY BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

1. THE TWO ORIGINAL DIVISIONS

Thus I have heard: a hundred and odd years[1] after the Parinirvāṇa of Bhagavant Buddha—(alas! that ominous time) being far from the time of the sage, (the age so dark) as if the sun had been setting for a long time—there was a king named Aśoka[2] at Kusumapūra[3] in the Magadha kingdom, who ruled over Jambudvīpa (India), as it were, under a (large) white umbrella, and his influence extended to the gods and men. It was at this time that the great Saṃgha was split up for the first time. On account of the differences (of opinion) among the four groups of people in discussing the five points (pañcavastūni), propounded by (lit. of) Mahādeva (大天), (the Buddhist Saṃgha) was divided into two schools, viz. the Mahāsaṃghika (大衆部) and the Sthaviravāda (上座部). What are the four groups? (They are):—

1. the Nāga group (龍象衆),
2. the border country (pratyantika)[4] group (邊鄙衆),
3. the learned (Bahuśrutīya) group (多聞衆) and
4. the venerable (Sthavira) group (大德衆).

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[1] According to the two other Chinese translations a hundred and sixteen years A. B. But the ¹Sha-chi says that in the original manuscripts there is no mention of "sixteen." The reading in the Tibetan version is the same as the T'ang-lun. Cf. Wassiljew, p. 246.

[2] Kālāśoka (?) who is said, according to the Burmese tradition, to have come to the throne 81 years after the death of the Buddha and ruled over India for twenty-eight years. K'wei-chi, the compiler of the ¹Shu-chi writes that he was a grandson of Bimbisāra.

[3] An ancient name of Pāṭaliputra or the modern Patna. The ¹Shu-chi, however, describes Pāṭaliputra as a city different from Kusumapūra, and to the west of it. Cf. the ¹Shu-chi, I; ¹Fa-jên, I, p. 22 ff.; Si-yu-ki, VIII (Beal, II p. 82 ff.).

[4] Wassiljew: prācya.

The five points (of Mahādeva) can be learned from the following verse (lit. are like his śloka-words):

(Arhants) are tempted by others and ignorance (they have),
Doubt (they have with regard to truths divine);
(Arhantship) thro' others' help they realize and the path
Thro' utterance (they ascertain)—this is Buddhism true.[1]

2. THE DIVISIONS IN THE MAHĀSAṂGHIKA SCHOOL

(Immediately) afterwards, during the second century (following the death of the Buddha) three schools arose out of the Mahāsaṃghika:

1. the Ekavyavahārika (一 說 部),
2. the Lokottaravāda (說 出 世 部),
3. the Kaukkuṭika (雞 胤 部).

Later on, again, during the second century, one school, the Bahuśrutīya (多 聞 部), issued from the Mahāsaṃghika.

Once again, immediately afterwards, during this second century, another school, the Prajñāptivāda (說 假 部) issued from the Mahāsaṃghika.

Towards the close of the second century, there was a heretic priest (steyasaṃvāsika) who returned to the right (doctrine), (*i. e.*, Buddhism) discarding his heretical (views). He, too, was called Mahādeva. Becoming a monk (pravrajita) and receiving his full ordination (upasaṃpadā) in the Mahāsaṃghika order, he was learned and diligent. He dwelt on the Caitya hill and discussed again in detail with the priests of his school the five points, (propounded by the first Mahādeva), whereupon, on account of dissencions, (the saṃgha) was split up into three schools:

1. the Caityaśaila (制 多 山 部),
2. the Aparaśaila (西 山 住 部),
3. the Uttaraśaila (北 山 住 部).

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[1] Lit. 1. Temptation by the other, 2. ignorance, 3. doubt, 4. entrance through the other, 5. the path arises through utterance. These are called the real teachings of Buddha.

餘所誘無知　猶豫他令入
道因聲故起　是名眞佛教

Cf. de la Vallée Poussin: the "Five Points" of Mahādeva and Kathāvatthu. J. R. A. S. 1910, pp. 413—423.

Thus the Mahāsaṃghika was divided four or five times (including the first schism). To reckon the root and branch (schools) separately, it becomes in all nine schools:—

1. the Mahāsaṃghika,
2. the Ekavyavahārika,
3. the Lokottaravāda,
4. the Kaukkuṭika,
5. the Bahuśrutīya,
6. the Prajñāptivāda,
7. the Caityaśaila,
8. the Aparaśaila,
9. the Uttaraśaila.

3. THE DIVISIONS IN THE STHAVIRAVĀDA SCHOOL

The Sthaviravāda remained in perfect harmony for a number of years.[1] At the beginning of the third century (after the death of the Buddha) there was a little dissension and it was divided into two schools, (viz.):—

1. the Sarvāstivāda (說一切有部), otherwise called the Hetuvāda (說因部),
2. the original (mūla) Sthaviravāda (根本上座部), which changed its name into the Haimavata school (雪山部).

Subsequently during the third century, one school named the Vātsīputrīya (犢子部) issued from the Sarvāstivāda.

Immediately afterwards, during this third century, four schools sprang from the Vātsīputrīya, (viz.):—

1. the Dharmottarīya (法上部),
2. the Bhadrāyaṇīya (賢冑部),
3. the Saṃmatīya (正量部),
4. the Channagirika[2] (密林山部).

Immediately afterwards, during this third century, another school, the Mahīśāsaka (化地部), issued from the Sarvāstivāda.

Immediately afterwards, during the same century, one school named the Dharmaguptika (法藏部) issued from the Mahīśāsaka.

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[1] Lit. for some time.

[2] Ch'in-lun: saṇṇagarika (六城部). The original Sanskrit in the Ch'en-lun seems to be the same as that in the T'ang-lun.

(The founder of this school) declares himself that he was the successor of Maudgalyāyana.

At the end of the third century one school, the Kāśyapīya (飲光部), otherwise called Suvarṣaka (善歲部), seceded from the Sarvāstivāda.

At the beginning of the fourth century one school, named the Sautrāntika (經量部), otherwise called the Saṃkrāntivāda (說轉部) issued again from the Sarvāstivāda. (The founder of this school) declares himself: "I take Ānanda as my preceptor."

Thus the Sthaviravāda was divided seven times or eight times (including the original schism). To reckon the root and branches separately, it becomes eleven schools altogether:—

1. the Sarvāstivāda,
2. the Haimavata,
3. the Vātsīputrīya,
4. the Dharmottarīya,
5. the Bhadrāyaṇīya,
6. the Sammatīya,
7. the Channagirika,
8. the Mahīśāsaka,
9. the Dharmaguptika,
10. the Kāśyapīya,
11. the Sautrāntika.

SECTION III

DOCTRINES OF EARLY BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

Now I shall explain the original doctrines (mūla-samaya) which were held in common (at the time of schisms) and the later differentiated doctrines (antara-samaya)[1] of such schools (as those mentioned above).

I.

THE MAHĀSAṂGHIKA, EKAVYAVAHĀRIKA, LOKOTTARAVĀDA AND KAUKKUṬIKA SCHOOLS.

A. The original doctrines which were held in common.

The original doctrines which were held in common (by the members) of the Mahāsaṃghika, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda and Kaukkuṭika schools were:—

The four schools unanimously maintain that:—

1. Buddhas, the World-honoured (Bhagavant) are all supermundane (lokottara).[2]

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1 Lit. the original and later doctrines and common and differentiated meanings.

2 The following fifteen propositions are concerned with the Buddhology of the Mahāsaṃghikas. As the reader can see at once, the Buddha of whom the Mahāsaṃghikas speak is not the historical Buddha. According to them the historical Buddha is nothing but the nirmāṇa-kāya or incarnation of the sambhoga-kāya. Here we find in the Mahāsaṃghika-Buddhology one of the earliest germs of the later trikāya-theory, which is already fully developed in Nāgārjuna's Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra and in the later Yogācāra literature. The Mahāsaṃghika-Buddhology will be clearly understood, when it is compared with that of the Sarvāstivādins and others, who recognise only the historical Buddha. Unfortunately, however, our text does not say much about the Buddhology of other schools. The following is the table of the propositions in Vasumitra's treatise which are concerned with the discussions about the Buddha and Bodhisattva:—

a. Propositions concerned with the personality of the Buddha.

The Mahāsaṃghika and their followers	I, A,	1—15
The Sarvāstivāda	V,	47—50

2. There are no sāsrava dharmas (有漏法) (or "defiled elements") in all the Tathāgatas.[1]

3. All the speeches of the Tathāgata are (concerned with) the preaching of the righteous law.[2]

4. The Buddha (can) expound all the doctrines (dharma) with a single utterance (lit. sound.)[3]

5. There is nothing which is not in conformity with the truth (不如義 ayathārtha) in what has been preached by the World-honoured One.[4]

6. The rūpakāya of the Tathāgata is indeed limitless.[5]

7. The divine power (prabhāva or tejas) of the Tathāgata is also limitless.[6]

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b. Propositions concerned with the personality of the Bodhisattva.

The Mahāsaṃghika and their followers	I, A,	16—20
The Caityaśaila, Aparaśaila & Uttaraśaila	IV,	1
The Sarvāstivāda	V,	39
The Haimavata	VI,	1 & 2

1 "The Vibhajyavādins and Mahāsaṃghikas hold that the physical body of the Buddha is the anāsrava-dharma, because in it all the passions (kleśa) and vāsanās are, without exception, eternally destroyed, and because, as is stated in the sūtras, although the Tathāgata is born in the world, abides in it and appears in it, yet he is not stained by the worldly dharmas. On these grounds they say that the body of the Buddha is the anāsrava body" ...... Vibhāṣā, CLXXIII. The school which takes the contrary view is the Sarvāstivāda. Cf. ˏFa-jên II, p. 12b. The Dharmaguptikas held the same view as the Mahāsaṃghikas as to the body of an Arhant. Cf. X, 5.

2 Lit. all turn the wheel of law (dharmacakrapravartana).

This is a well-known phrase and is generally used of Buddha's first sermon at Benares when he imparted his essential doctrines to the five Brahmans. But the Mahāsaṃghika idealists and their followers seem to have applied this phrase not only to the first sermon and also the sermons in the whole period of Buddha's ministry, but even to ordinary speeches in the every-day life of the Buddha. The Mahāvibhāṣā (Chin. tr. CLXXX) has handed down to us an interesting account and disputes about this between the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Sarvāstivādins, the two contending schools.

According to the Sarvāstivādins the dharmacakra or "Wheel of Law" means the destroyer of passion. That which destroys passion is the eightfold path or the teaching in the first sermon and nothing else. But the Mahāsaṃghikas and their followers contended that the speeches of the Blessed Ones, whether doctrinal discourses or ordinary speeches, all are conducive to enlightenment on the part of the hearers. All are therefore to be looked upon as the dharmacakra or "Wheel of Law". (Cf. ˀShu-chi II; ˏFa-jên II, p. 14a, f.) As to the Sarvāstivāda view cf. V, 47.

3 A view, contrary to the Sarvāstivādins, cf. V, 48.

4 A view, contrary to the Sarvāstivādins, cf. V, 49.

5 Evidently the "rūpakāya of Tathāgata" means here the sambhogakāya and not the body of the historical Buddha, which is nothing but the nirmāṇakāya.

6 According to the ˀShu-chi this proposition means that the divine power of Buddha

8. The length of life of the Buddhas is also limitless.[1]

9. The Buddha is never tired of enlightening the sentient beings and awakening pure faith (śradhā) (in them).[2]

10. The Buddha has neither sleep nor dream (svapna).[3]

11. The Tathāgata does not pause in answering a question.[4]

12. At no time does the Buddha preach (after the arrangement of) nouns (nāma) and so on, because he is always in samādhi, but the sentient beings rejoice, considering that the Buddha preaches (after the arrangement of) nouns and so on.[5]

13. (The Blessed One) understands all things (dharma) with a "moment's mind" (ekakṣaṇikacitta).[6]

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pervades all the worlds in all directions in a moment, even without Buddha's exercising his mind. Against this the other schools are said to have insisted that Buddha's power pervades them only when he exercises his mind. (Cf. ʿShu-chi; ˌFa-jên II, p. 18 a.)

1 *I. e.*, the life of sambhogakāya continues to exist so long as the sentient being continues to exist. Cf. ʿShu-chi; ˌFa-jên II, p. 18b.

2 The compassion of the Buddha is limitless, so also his life. He is never tired of salvation. Therefore he never enters into nirvāṇa. Against this other schools, such as the Sarvāstivāda etc. maintained that the Bnddha enters into eternal nirvāṇa after the accomplishment of the work of salvation. ˌFa-jên II, p. 19 a.

3 Because he is always in the state of "abstract meditation" (samādhi).

Against this the Sarvāstivādins contended that the Buddha sleeps though he does not dream. Dreams arise out of delusion and desire. Buddha has neither of these: therefore he has no dreams. But he sleeps because he has a physical body. (Cf. ʿShu-chi; ˌFa-jên II, p. 19b, f.)

4 That is to say, answers flow of their own accord. (See the next proposition and the note on it.) The Tibetan version is somewhat different and runs as follows: „Auf Fragen geben sie sinngemäss Auskunft." Cf. Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus by Professor Walleser. (This work is not yet published.)

5 Not only do the speeches of Buddha flow from his "golden mouth" of their own accord, but they form at once, as it were, wreaths of pearls and gems. But ignorant audiences rejoice, considering that the Buddha preaches after the artistic arrangement of words, clauses and sentences etc. and gladdens them by his eloquence.

The contrary view of other schools is that, though the Buddha needs no special effort in replies, yet he does answer or preach after arrangement of his speeches. (Cf. ˌFa-jên II, p. 21 a.)

6 The ʿShu-chi interprets the present proposition as follows:—"The Buddha trains his mind for a number of kalpas. There is none who can surpass the Buddha in understanding all things (dharma). (In the text: citta; this is evidently the mistranscription of dharma.) Therefore the "moment mind" of the Buddha can understand the differences and the substance (svabhāva) of all things and can realize (them). (According to) other schools the mind of the Buddha cannot understand all things in a moment: the svabhāva (the perceiving mind—so interpreted in the supercommentary), samprayukta (caitasika) and sahabhū (the sense-organs?) are not to be unterstood (lit. are excepted) (when the mind perceives other things).— —"

14. (The Blessed One) knows all things (dharma) with the wisdom befitting a "moment's mind" (ekakṣaṇikacittasamprayuktaprajñā).[1]

15. The kṣayajñāna (盡 智) or "knowledge of extinction" and the anutpādajñāna (無 生 智) or "knowledge of non-rebirth" are always present in Buddhas, the world-honoured, and they continue to be so till their parinirvāṇa.[2]

16. None of the Bodhisattvas, when they enter (their) mothers' wombs, form their own bodies by passing through (lit. receive) (the four embryonic stages), kalala, arbuda, peśī and ghana (which ordinary people pass through.)[3]

17. All the Bodhisattvas assume (lit. make) the forms of white elephants when they enter their mothers' wombs.

18. All the Bodhisattvas are born from the right side when they come out of their mothers' wombs.

19. None of the Bodhisattvas entertain thoughts of greed (kāmasaṃjñā), of anger (vyāpādasaṃjñā) or of harming others (vihiṃsāsaṃjñā).

20. For the benefit of sentient beings (sattva) Bodhisattvas are born into bad states (gati) at will and can be born (lit. go) (into any of them) as they like.

21. Through the possession of the "after-knowledge" which follows the comprehension (of the truths) for one moment (ekakṣaṇikābhisamayāntikajñāna) one perceives, in their full significance (lit. all round) the four truths with their specific differences.[4]

According to the Fa-jên the Dharmaguptikas and Mahīśāsakas also shared the view of the Mahāsaṃghikas. The Mahāsaṃghikas are said to be the only people who insisted that the subjective mind could perceive its svabhāva, while others, especially the Sarvāstivādins, thought that the mind could not perceive its mind, just as a sword cannot cut itself. (Cf. V, 29 and p. 48, note 5.) This view is set forth in the Vibhāṣā IX in the following way: "—Because a sword cannot cut itself and because Vasumitra says that it is not the object of thought (viṣaya) (the mind) cannot know its svabhāva." In connection with this proposition we are required to take notice of the following passage in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, XXVI:—"At the time of meditation on all things as non-ego the perceiving mind (svabhāva) is excepted." Cf. Fa-jên II, p. 21b f.

[1] A similar proposition to the preceding one. The only difference is that the present proposition is held of a caitasika, namely prajñā or wisdom.

[2] Cf. V, 9 and p. 42, note 2.

[3] The following five propositions are exclusively concerned with Bodhisattvas. Cf. p. 18, note 2. As to the embryonic stages cf. Mah. v.

[4] A proposition concerned with a mode of meditation upon the four āryan truths. The four āryan truths have sixteen different aspects (十 六 行 相 ṣoḍaśākāra), namely:

22. The five consciousnesses[1] (pañcavijñānakāya), the eye and so forth (conduce both to) passion (sarāga) and to freedom from passion (virāga).

23. The world of form and the formless world (rūpa and arūpa-dhātu) (both) possess a complete set (lit. an aggregate) of the six consciousnesses (ṣaḍvijñānakāya).[2]

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1. duḥkha (suffering), 2. anitya (transitotiness), 3. śūnya (voidness), 4. anātmaka (non-ego), 5. samudaya (aggregation), 6 prabhava (birth), 7. hetu (cause), 8. pratyaya (condition), 9. nirodha (annihilation), 10. śānta (quietude), 11. praṇīta (agreeableness), 12. niḥsaraṇa (liberation), 13. mārga (path), 14. nyāya (fitness), 15. pratipatti (proceeding), 16. nairyāṇika (eternal emancipation). (Cf. Abhidharmakośa-śāstra chap. VI, chin. tr. XXII; Mah. v.) According to the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, an authority of the Sarvāstivāda school, these sixteen aspects are to be meditated upon one after another. The Sarvāstivādins did not think that these sixteen aspects can be meditated upon simultaneously. On the other hand, however, the Mahāsaṃghikas have insisted, as is shown in the present proposition that they can be meditated upon simultaneously when a Buddhist has acquired comprehension of truth in the darśana-mārga.

The darśana-mārga is the first path of sanctification of a Buddhist saint, the second being the bhāvanā-mārga. In this first path a Buddhist attains full comprehension of the truth by passing through its sixteen sub-stages of meditation. This full comprehension of the truth is technically called abhisamaya in Sanskrit.

Antikajñāna or "after-knowledge" in this proposition signifies the knowledge which accrues after the full comprehension of the truth. It is this "after-knowledge" which, according to the Mahāsaṃghikas, enables a Buddhist to perceive simultaneously all the different aspects mentioned above.

It is, however, interesting to observe, that the view of the Mahāsaṃghikas was contradicted by the later Mahāsaṃghikas (cf. I B, 1) but supported by the Mahīśāsakas (cf. IX A, 2). For the contrary proposition of the Sarvāstivādins in Vasumitra's treatise cf. V, 5. Those who are interested in this subject cf. further the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra chap. VI, chin. tr. XXIII, where an interesting discussion on this problem is preserved.

1 Lit. the body of the five consciousnesses.—No doubt the "body" here is the translation of kāya in the sense of group. In order to avoid confusion, however, I have not translated this word purposely.

The Sarvāstivādins maintained that the first fifteen (five indriyas, five viṣayas and five vijñānas) of the eighteen elements (dhatu) were only sāsrava. Therefore they have no virāga though they have rāga. The school which has adopted the opposite attitude as to this question is the Vātsīputrīya. The Mahasaṃghikas acknowledged both rāga and sarāga. (Cf. V, 26; VII, 5; IX A, 10.)

2 The Sarvāstivādins maintained that the two consciousnesses, namely the nose-consciousness (ghrāṇavijñāna) and tongue-consciousness (jihvāvijñāna) of the so-called six consciousnesses are wanting in the devalokas above the second dhyāna. (Cf. the table in p. 43, note 1) though their sense-organs (indriya) exist even there. But the Mahāsaṃghikas contended that the existence of sense-organs presupposes the existence of their respective consciousnesses and the existence of the consciousnesses their "objective correlatives." Thus the Mahāsaṃghikas maintained the existence of the eighteen dhātus throughout the three worlds. This view seems to contradict the general belief of the

24. The sense-organs (rūpendriya) of five kinds are nothing but lumps of flesh (lit. have lumps of flesh as their bodies).

The eyes do not see colours; the ears do not hear sounds; the nose does not smell odours; the tongue does not taste flavour; the body does not feel touch.[1]

25. (Even) in the state of the samāhita (等引) one can utter words (lit. there is an utterance of speech): there is also a subdued mind (調伏心) and also a quarrelsome mind (諍作意).[2]

26. One who has accomplished what ought to be done (所作已辦 kṛtakṛtyaḥ) does not take (ādā) anything (dharma) (to himself).[3]

non-existence of rūpa in the arūpa-dhātu. The Mahāsaṃghikas tried to solve this question by a postulation of the existence of subtle rūpas. The rūpas in the arūpa-dhātu are extremely subtle when compared with those in the other two worlds. Therefore there is no absurdity in calling the highest group of brahma-lokas arūpa-dhātu. (Cf. Fa-jên II, p. 30 b f.)

1 The question—"Is sense-cognition due to the sense-organs (indriya) or to sense-consciousness (vijñāna)?"—was a problem amongst the early Buddhist scholastics. The Mahāsaṃghikas were inclined to think that sense-cognition is due to sense-consciousnesses. The sense-organs which are, according to them, mere lumps of flesh, are like windows through which the sense-consciousnesses can acquire their sense-cognition. The Sarvāstivādins postulated, however, the existence of subtle sense-organs besides the ordinary sense-organs, through which man can derive sense-cognition. (Cf. Shu-chi; Fa-jên II, p. 31 f.)

2 That is to say, one can utter words even when in the samāhita or dhyāna because the mind in the state of dhyāna is not altogether unconscious of the external world. The stimuli which come from the external world are still perceptible even in the state of dhyāna and afford opportunity to the mind to ponder over them.

The state of the samāhita is commonly believed by the sectarians of the Sarvāstivāda and other schools to be total unconsciousness of the external world, the senses being withdrawn altogether from the external world. (Cf. V, 46). But the Mahāsaṃghikas deviated from this general belief.

We have an account of an interesting controversy with reference to this proposition. Once upon a time Maudgalyāyana is said to have sat in the Ākiñcanyāyatana-samādhi or "the meditation of the realm of nothingness." As he so sat he heard the bellow of an elephant and, on account of this, he emerged from the abstract meditation (the Mahāvibhāṣā, Chin. tr. LXXXV). The Mahāsaṃghikas took this to mean that Maudgalyāyana heard the bellow in the state of samādhi. But the Sarvāstivādins contended that he heard the noise when he came out from the samādhi, because there is no ear-consciousness in that state. The Hindu conception of the state of Yoga is that of total unconsciousness of the external world; what exists there is only the consciousness of the spiritual world. On this point the Hindu view is akin to that of the Sarvāstivādins.

3 Kṛtakṛtya is a frequent epithet of Aśaikṣa signifying the person who has reached the goal of perfection by going through the stages of progressive sanctification. The phrase "does not accept things" is interpreted in the Shu-chi to mean "not to have any attachment to things." Therefore this proposition seems to mean that those who

27. The citta and caitasika dharmas of Srotaāpannas are capable of knowing (their) nature (svabhāva).[1]

28. a) Arhants (also) can be tempted by others,
b) (They) have still ignorance,
c) (They) have still doubt,
d) (They) gain spiritual perception by the help of others, (lit. enlightenment through the other),
e) The path is realized by utterances.[2]

29. Suffering leads a man to the path.[3]

30. The words of suffering can help (the process of realization of the path).[4]

31. Through the instrumentality (prayoga) of wisdom (prajñā) one annihilates suffering and is also capable of obtaining the final beatitude (sukha)[5].

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have reached the goal of perfection in Buddhism are free from attachment to any thing. This idea of non-attachment of an Arhat is generally taken to be a universal belief of all Buddhists. But the 'Shu-chi describes the Sarvāstivādins and others to have maintained that even Aśaikṣas have attachment. Unfortunately, however, the 'Shu-chi does not give any references to the authority on which this assertion is based.

The reading of this proposition in the Ch'in-lun and also in the Ch'en-lun is somewhat different. The last phrase in these versions is: "There is no place." Does the word "place" signify the place of attachment or place of retribution?

1 This is one of the most ambiguous propositions. The 'Shu-chi gives two interpretations. According to the first of these this proposition means: A Srotaāpanna or "a Buddhist sage who has just entered upon the stream of the āryan path" is capable of knowing by himself that he has entered upon it; to realize this he does not require anyone to inform him of the fact. If this first interpretation can be accepted, we must translate this proposition as follows: "The Srotaāpannas are capable of knowing their own nature (svabhāva) through their citta and caitasika dharmas," as Wassiljew has translated it. Cf. Wassiljew, p. 262.

The second interpretation is that a Srotaāpanna is capable of knowing by himself the nature of his citta and caitasika in a moment. Then it may be asked: Are average-men (pṛthagjana) and the sages other than the Srotaāpannas unable to know the nature of their minds? According to the 'Shu-chi and Fa-jên they cannot know the nature of their minds as clearly as the Srotaāpannas do.

2 The five points of Mahādeva. (Cf. p. 15, note 1; II, 2; IV, 3; VI, 5.)

3 The experiencing of suffering (duḥkha-vedanā) in this world is bound to give a man a feeling of aversion to it. And this feeling, in its turn, leads him to renunciation and eventually to the āryan path.

4 A similar proposition to I A, 28, e. The frequent utterance of the word "suffering" arouses one's dislike for this world and thus helps the process of realization of the path.

5 The present proposition signifies that the observances of śīla and dhyāna do not contribute to the annihilation of suffering and the attainment of the eternal beatitude of

32. Suffering also is (a kind of) food (āhāra).[1]

33. In the eighth stage (aṣṭamakabhūmi) one can also remain for a long time.[2]

34. From (conversion) onwards to (yāvat) (the stage of) the gotrabhūmidharma (性地法) or "the stage of transformation of personality" there is in all (stages) (the possibility of) retrogression (for those who are on the path of progressive sanctification).[3]

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nirvāṇa: knowledge is the only means through which man can obtain freedom from suffering and can enter into nirvāṇa. Fa-jên II, 36a.

[1] Deest in the Tibetan version and in the Ch'in-lun.

"Because the beings in the infernal regions (are said to) subsist on lumps of heated iron, (but) still retain their lives." Cf. Shu-chi II.

The āhāra or "food" is generally described in the Buddhist literature to be of four kinds (catvāra āhārāḥ), viz.: kavaḍiṃkārāhāra, sparśāhāra, manaḥsaṃcetanāhāra and vijñānāhāra, or "food made into balls (material food), food of touch, food of thought, food of consciousness." The present proposition describes suffering also as a food. Is this suffering a food other than the food of the four kinds? Or does it fall under one of the four heads? If so, under which? The Shu-chi is altogether silent as to these questions. Perhaps "food of suffering" may fall under the category of food of touch. Cf. Fa-jên II, p. 36a f.

[2] Here "the eighth stage" means the first path of sanctification of Āryapudgalas or "holy personages." It corresponds to the darśana-mārga or "the path where a Buddhist saint sees the truth which he has not yet seen." (As to the two paths of Āryapudgalas, *i. e.*, bhāvanā-mārga and darśana-mārga see p. 21, note 4.) Then, why is the first path of sanctification of Āryapudgalas called the eighth stage? According to Buddhism the holy persons are eight in number and have the following names: Srotaāpattipratipannaka, Srotaāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmipratipannaka, Sakṛdāgāmin. Anāgāmipratipannaka, Anāgāmin, Arhatpratipannaka and Arhant. When we count the above eight persons in reversed order the Srotaāpattipratipannaka becomes the eighth. The darśana-mārga corresponds to the stage where this eighth saint stays. Hence the darśana-mārga is called here the eighth stage. Cf. Shu-chi; Fa-jên II, p. 36b.

The problem in this proposition is the question of the sojourn of an Āryan pudgala in the eighth stage or darśana-mārga. According to the Sarvāstivādins the comprehension of the truths in this stage does not require more than fifteen moments (kṣaṇa), whereas the Mahāsaṃghikas and others maintained that it might be extended over a much longer time. To explain this view the Shu-chi makes a reference to an incident, which is said to have taken place when Sudatta was distributing food among priests. It is said that, on this occasion, there was a heavenly voice in the sky which announced that so and so are in the Srotaāpattimārga etc. (Cf. the Madhyamāgama, IX; Ekottarāgama, IV; Mahāvibhāṣā CXXXI.) If a person in this stage is allowed to emerge from the abstract meditation and partake of food, then the sojourn in that stage must be much longer than the Sarvāstivādins maintained. (Cf. Shu-chi II; Fa-jên II, p. 36 f.)

[3] As we have already seen elsewhere (p. 21, note 4) the paths of progressive sanctification of a Buddhist saint are two in number. Are there any regular paths, so to speak, along which a convert has to walk till he becomes a saint (āryapudgala)? The Abhidharma-

35. A Srotaāpanna has a chance (lit. meaning) of retrogression (vinivartana) (while) an Arhant has not.[1]

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kośa-śāstra (ch. VI, chin. tr. XXII, XXIII) describes a path of preliminary sanctification in seven stages for such a person.

Those who are desirous of realizing the aryan paths are required first to keep their body and mind pure, by retiring to a quiet place and eschewing greediness. This is the first stage of primary sanctification. Then they are required to perform the exercise of meditation upon impurity (不淨觀 aśuddhabhāvanā), the fixation of the mind upon respiration (持息觀 or 阿那波那念 ānāpānasmṛti), and so on. By these exercises they are able to acquire śamatha or tranquillity. When they have acquired śamatha in the second stage, they have to observe the fourfold smṛtyupasthāna (cf. p. 44, note 2) in the third stage. By virtue of these observations they acquire insight (vipaśyana) into the real nature of kāya, vedanā, citta and dharma, or "body, sensation, thought and things." The above are the three elementary stages of the primary sanctification, through which the spiritual fire which destroys the human passion, so to speak, is gradually kindled and thus the fourth stage receives the name of uṣmagata (煖) or "heat" (which serves to destroy passion). The fifth stage is called mūrdhāna (頂) or "head". In this stage the virtue (kuśalamūla) which was cultivated in the preceding stage attains its consummation. The next stage is kṣānti (忍) or "forbearance". In this stage the Buddhist gets the full comprehension (kṣamaṇa) of the four āryan truths, the different aspects of which he has meditated upon in this and in the preceding stages (cf. p. 21, note 4). The last stage is called laukikāgradharma (世第一法) or "the highest worldly dharma." It is so called because it is the highest stage in the primary sanctification. It is a "moment state" from which a Buddhist proceeds at once to the first stage of the secondary sanctification, namely that of the āryapudgalas (Cf. p. 25, note 2).

The stage which is called the *gotrabhūmidharma* in the present proposition is understood to be the same as the laukikāgradharma, the last stage of the primary sanctification. Then, why is the laukikāgradharma called the stage of gotrabhūmidharma or "the stage of transformation of personality"? The Mahāvibhāṣā (chin. tr. III) gives three reasons. The first two of them are that (1) at the stage of laukikāgradharma one relinquishes the nature (gotra) of an average man (pṛthagjana) and (2) acquires the nature of a saint (āryapudgala). In short this is the stage where the transformation of the personality of a man takes place. Hence this name.

As to the question of the retrogression of a pṛthagjana the Sarvāstivādins propounded a theory that for a man above the kṣānti there is no retrogression, *i. e.*, his attainment of saintship is secure. But the Mahāsaṃghikas contended that there is every possibility of falling away for a man in every stage of sanctification from conversion to the laukikāgradharma. For the view of the Sarvāstivādins cf. proposition V, 7.

1 We have seen in the preceding proposition the view of the Mahāsaṃghikas concerning the question of retrogression of a pṛthagjana who is on the path (mārga) leading to saintship. Now the present proposition is concerned with a person who has entered upon the path of saintship but is still travelling towards the goal of perfection.

As I have stated elsewhere (Cf. p. 25, note 2) the Buddhist saints are divided into eight classes. But they are often put broadly into four: viz. Srotaāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmin, Anāgāmin and Arhant. The Srotaāpanna and Arhant which are mentioned in this proposition are the two of these four classes of saints.

According to the Mahāsaṃghikas a Srotaāpanna is subject to retrogression because he has still passions to destroy and virtues to cultivate. But for an Arhant the case

36. There is neither worldly "right-view" (laukikasamyagdṛṣṭi) nor worldly power of faith (laukikaśraddhendriya).[1]

37. There is nothing which is indeterminate (無記法 avyākṛtadharma).[2]

38. When one enters into the samyaktva-nyāma (正性離生) one may be said to destroy all the saṃyojanas (結) or "bonds".[3]

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is quite different. He can never fall away because he has no passions to annihilate and nothing to learn. He has reached the goal of perfection.

In the text there is no reference to the Sakṛdāgāmin and Anāgāmin. But the commentary Shu-chi takes them to have the same chance of retrogression as a Srotaāpanna.

The question of retrogression of a saint when he is on his way towards the goal of perfection seems to have been one of the most widely discussed theological problems. The following is a table of the views of various schools:—

The class of saints / Schools	Srotaāpanna	Sakṛdāgāmin	Anāgāmin	Arhant
Sarvāstivāda	No retrogression	Subject to retrogression	Subject to retrogression	Subject to retrogression
Mahāsaṃghika & Mahīśāsaka	Subject to retrogression	Subject to retrogression	Subject to retrogression	No retrogression
Sautrāntika	No retrogression	Subject to retrogression	Subject to retrogression	No retrogression

Cf. V, 8; VIII, p. 55, note 2; IX A, 17. Fa-jên II, p. 38 f.

1 The term "worldly" (laukika) is employed here in the sense of sāsrava. This proposition seems to signify that there is neither sāsrava "right-view" nor sāsrava "right faith". Cf. V, 30; IX A, 13.

2 The Sarvāstivādins said that there were three natures of things, namely good, bad and indeterminate, while the Mahāsaṃghikas denied the existence of indeterminate things. According to them the nature of things must be either good or bad. (Cf. V, 31.)

3 The proper Sanskrit form of nyama seems to be niyatna or niyāma which means restraint, limitation etc. But in the Buddhist sanskrit nyāma and niyāma are often distinguished from one another (cf. Mah. v.). In the T'ang-lun and Ch'in-lun nyāma is translated as "apart from rawness". Evidently the translators understood the etymology of this word as nis+āma. But both samyaktvanyāma (正性離生) and samyaktvaniyāma (正性決定) are used in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra (chap. VI, Chin. tr. XXIII) in the same sense. Both of them refer to the first stage of the darśana-mārga. Samyaktva is interpreted in the aforementioned authority to mean "nirvāṇa or āryan path" and rawness (āma) "the passion or that indriya which did not ripe. The āryan path can transcend this rawness, therefore the use of the word nyāma. And also (the āryan path) is bound to lead to nirvāṇa and determine the aspects of the truths. Therefore all the āryan truths receive the name of the niyāma or determination." Cf. Wogihara: Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 30 ff.

The saṃyojanas are a group of human passions which bind a man to continued existence. It is a frequent epithet of kleśa which is, however, wider in its denotation.

39. The Srotaāpannas (are liable to) commit all (sorts of) sins (pāpa) except (those five capital offences which incur punishment) immediately (pañcānantaryāṇi).[1]

40. The sūtras (or "discourses") preached by the Buddha are all perfect in themselves (了 義 nītārtha.)[2]

41. The asaṃskṛtadharmas (無 爲 法)[3] are of nine kinds, viz.:

The classification of the saṃyojanas differs according to the school. The Sarvāstivādins divided them into nine classes and maintained that three of these, namely satkāyadṛṣṭi, vicikitsā and śīlavrataparāmarśa or "the heresy of individuality, doubt and affectation of rites" are put away by a Srotaāpanna in the first path of sanctification. But the Mahāsaṃghikas maintained that a Srotaāpanna destroys all the saṃyojanas; Hence this proposition.

[1] Here "all the sinful actions" is interpreted in the [?]Shu-chi to mean the ten sinful actions. The so-called ten sinful actions are: 1. prāṇātipāta, 2. adattādāna, 3. kāmamithyācāra, 4. mṛṣāvāda, 5. pāruṣya, 6. paiśunya, 7. sambhinnapralāpa, 8. abhidhyāya, 9. vyāpāda and 10. mithyādṛṣṭi, or "killing, stealing, impurity, lying, slander, harsh language, frivolous talk, covetousness, malice and false doctrine." Cf. Mah. v. daśasucaritam.

According to the Sarvāstivādins the Srotaāpannas are free from these sins. But the Mahāsaṃghikas maintained that even the Srotaāpannas are liable to commit most of them, because these actions are often committed without reflection. As we have seen in the preceding proposition the Mahāsaṃghikas insisted that the Srotaāpannas destroy all the saṃyojanas. But they are said to have still many passions which are to be removed in the higher stages in the bhāvanā-mārga. Therefore they still commit the ten sinful actions, but they do not commit the following five capital offences (pañcānantaryāṇi)—mātṛghāta, arhadvadha, pitṛghāta, saṃghabheda, tathāgatasyāntike duṣṭacittarudhirotpādana, or matricide, murdering an Arhant, patricide, causing division in the Saṃgha, and causing blood to flow from (lit. in the vicinity of) a Tathāgata with evil intention. Cf. Mah. v.; Fa-jên II, p. 41 a ff.)

[2] The original of the Chinese which I have rendered here as "perfect in themselves" is undoubtedly nītārtha (p. nītattha). The Sanskrit nītārtha signifies in its literal or ordinary sense a settled meaning, a clear meaning, intelligibility etc. But here it refers to sūtras which are considered to be free from anītārtha or unintelligibility or ambiguity. After much consideration, therefore, I found it convenient to translate this as "perfect in themselves." Prof. Walleser has translated this word as „genauer Sinn."

Evidently this proposition is aimed at the Sarvāstivādins who maintained the existence of a class of imperfect sūtras on the ground that Buddha himself admitted them by saying: Don't depend upon imperfect sūtras, but on perfect ones. (Cf. the Nirvāṇasūtra, chin. tr. VI; Yogācāryabhūmi-śāstra, chin. tr. XLV, etc.) But the Mahāsaṃghikas interpreted this that herein anītārtha sūtra means the teachings of heretics whereas nītārtha sūtra Buddha's discourses. Cf. the [?]Shu-chi II. (It is not without interest to note that a Chinese numerical dictionary of Buddhism interpreted nītārtha-sūtras as Mahāyāna sūtras and anītārtha-sūtras as Hīnayāna sūtras. Cf. the Ta-ming-san-tsang-fa-su, Art. "Four dependencies".) As to the Sarvāstivāda view cf. V, 50.

[3] The term asaṃskṛta-dharmas means, in its ordinary sense, unmade, unaggregated things. It is an antonym of saṃskṛta-dharmas, but as technical term it seems to signify the eternal truth or the absolute. All the saṃskṛta-dharmas are governed by the natural law of birth, stay, decay and destruction, but none of the asaṃskṛta-dharmas are subject to this law.

a) Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha or "extinction (which is realized) by the discriminating (lit. enumerating) (power of wisdom)."
b) Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, or "extinction (which is) not (realized) by the discriminating (power of wisdom)."
c) Ākāśa, or "space".
d) Ākāśānantyāyatana, or "realm of infinity of space."
e) Vijñānānantyāyatana, or "realm of infinity of intelligence."
f) Ākiñcanyāyatana, or "realm of nothingness."
g) Naivasaṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana, or "realm where there is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness."
h) Pratītya-samutpādāṅgikatva, or "law of causation."
i) Ārya-mārgāṅgikatva, or "law of the āryan paths."

The first three asaṃskṛta-dharmas of the Mahāsaṃghikas have the same names as those of the Sarvāstivādins and Mahīśāsakas. According to the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra the first of the three, namely pratisaṃkhyā nirodha, signifies "the emancipation which is realized by putting away the bonds (*i. e.*, passions) of the sāsrava-dharma." (Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra chap. I.) The emancipation in Buddhism means the realization of nirvāṇa. Therefore pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha signifies the nirvāṇa which is realized as the result of the destruction of the passions. (The Sanskrit pratisaṃkhyā implies enumeration, being derived from khyā with prati+sam. But this term is translated into Chinese by the character 擇, which signifies "selection". Herein selection means the discriminative power (擇力) of the transcendental knowledge, by means of which a man will be able to realize nirvāṇa.) The second, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, means that which is "not (realized) by the discriminative power (of knowledge). (It is the absolute which may be manifested when) the causes are eternally robbed of their force (lit. destroyed) (Fa-jên II, p. 43a). The third, ākāśa, implies in its ordinary sense, sky, ether etc., but here it seems to mean absolute space.

The next four asaṃskṛta-dharmas, namely ākāśānantyāyatana, vijñānāntyāyatana, akiñcanyāyatana and naivasaṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana are interpreted in the 'Shu-chi to be "the places on which the four arūpas depend." The four arūpas mentioned here are the four realms in the arūpa-dhātu or "formless world." (Cf. table in p. 43, note 1.) Does this signify that these four asaṃskṛta-dharmas are the ontological substances out of which the four realms in the arūpadhātu take their being? The 'Shu-chi seems to give an affirmative answer to this question. It says that "when a man attains one of these asaṃskṛta-dharmas (lit. gets this extinction) he is born into one of the four realms (lit. there) depending upon the attained asaṃskṛta-dharma (lit. it)." If this interpretation can be accepted we are justified in conjecturing that the Mahāsaṃghikas have entertained the dynamic idea of the absolute.

The last two asaṃskṛta-dharmas are the laws of causation and emancipation. The Sarvāstivādins regarded the law of causation to be of the nature of saṃskāra (cf. V, 22), but the Mahāsaṃghikas considered it to be permanent truth and placed it under the category of asaṃskṛta-dharmas.

In the Tibetan version the ninth asaṃskṛta-dharma is described to be „das durch zufällig aufsteigende (āgantuka) Trübungen (upakleśa) (verdunkelte) Denken (citta), seinem Wesen nach (prakṛtyā) (aber) hell." (Translation by Walleser. Wassiljew's translation

42. The nature of mind is pure in its origin: it becomes impure when it is stained by passions (upakleśa 隨煩惱), the "adventitious dusts" (客塵 āgantuka-rajas?)[1]

43. The anuśayas (隨眠) (or "dormant passions") are neither citta nor caitasika-dharmas: and again they never become the object of thought (anālambana).[2]

44. The anuśaya (or "dormant passion") is different from the paryavasthāna (纏) (or "pervading passion") and the paryavasthāna is different from the anuśaya. It must be said that the anuśaya does not combine with (samprayuj) the citta, whereas the paryavasthāna does.[3]

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also is almost the same as this. Cf. p. 265.) But this is evidently an error on the part of the Tibetan translator. The citta or "mind", which is counted as an asaṃskṛta-dharma in the Tibetan version, is believed by most of the early Abhidharmikas to be that which perishes in a moment (Cf. p. 54, note 2). As such it can never be reckoned as an asaṃskṛta-dharma. The Chinese has a proposition about the nature of citta immediately after the description of the nine asaṃskṛta-dharmas. When we take this fact into consideration, we cannot help conjecturing that the Tibetan translator has lost sight of the ninth asaṃskṛta.dharma in the original Sanskrit text and translated erroneously the next proposition as the ninth.

For the views of other schools about the asaṃskṛta-dharma cf. V, 4, 22; IX A, 19 and the notes on them.

[1] This is one of the most interesting propositions from a historical point of view. The essential doctrines which are set forth in Aśvaghoṣa's "Awakening of Faith" (tr. by Suzuki, Chicago 1900) are nothing but the full exposition of the thoughts which developed from the ideas set forth in this proposition.

[2] The Mahāsaṃghikas called the bījas of passions, *i. e.*, the passions which remain under the threshold of our consciousness "anuśayas" and their manifestation "paryavasthānas." (Cf. Fa-jên II, p. 45.) On this point their views are different from the Sarvāstivādins, according to whom the term anuśaya is an epithet of kleśa or the passions both below and above the threshold of consciousness.

The following is the translation of the interpretation in the Shu-chi:—"The anuśayas are (the bijas of) rāga and the other (passions). There are ten kinds of anuśayas: (they exist even) in the state of absence of mind and even at the time when one has good (thoughts) etc. The pṛthagjanas or "ordinary men" are so called because they have always the anuśayas in them (lit. in the body). If (the anuśayas) were caitasikas (or manifested passions, ordinary men) would be saints in the state of absence of mind etc., because there could be no passions (kleśa) (in that state). (But in reality they are not saints.) The anuśayas are neither citta nor caitasika; therefore they are not to be perceived. If they could be perceived they would have to be caitasikas."

As to the Sarvāstivāda and Mahīśāsaka views on this problem cf. V, 20; IX A, 3.

[3] As I said in the preceding note the anuśaya is, according to the Mahāsaṃghikas, the dormant passion below the threshold of our consciousness, while the paryavasthāna its manifestation above the threshold. On this point the nature of the two differs. Being a mental phenomenon (caitasika) the paryavasthāna can be perceived by our own mind

45. Phenomena exist neither in the past (atīta) nor in the future (anāgata) (lit. the past and future are not the real substances).[1]

46. None of the dharmāyatanas (法 處) can be known or understood: they can be attained (通 達 gatiṃgata) (only by those Āryan pudgalas above the darśana-mārga).[2]

47. There is no intermediate state of existence (中 有 antarābhava).[3]

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or to speak technically, it can combine with the citta (citta-samprayukta). But the anuśaya does not combine with the citta (cittavisaṃprayukta).

The Mahīśāsakas held the same opinion as the Mahāsaṃghikas on this subject, the Sarvāstivādins a contrary view (cf. V, 21; IX A, 4.)

1 As we shall see later on the Sarvāstivādins insisted on the existence of the substances of things in the past, the present and the future. But the Mahāsaṃghikas maintained that substances do not exist in the past and future; they only exist in the present. Phenomena come into existence in accordance with the law of causation and are subject to the law of momentary change. In the past both the "substances and the functions" of things have been already destroyed and in the future they are not yet brought into being. Phenomena exist therefore only in the present. This is the well-known non-existence-theory as to the past and future of the Mahāsaṃghikas. This view was supported by the earlier Mahīśāsakas (cf. IX A, 1), but was contradicted by the Sarvāstivādins and the later Mahīśāsakas (cf. V, 1; IX B, 1).

2 The dharmāyatanas are the "external correlative" of the internal mind. In other words they are the objects with which the mind occupies itself. As such this word is often rendered as ideas or thoughts. But here it conveys a specific meaning. Failing to discover a proper English equivalent I found it convenient to leave this word untranslated.

According to the Shu-chi the dharmāyatanas here mean 1. asaṃskṛtadharmas (cf. p. 28, note 3), 2. caitasikadharmas or "mental states" and 3. ajñāptirūpas (無 表 色) or "incomprehensible or invisible matters." These dharmāyatanas were held by the Mahāsaṃghikas to be too lofty or subtle to be understood through the aid of worldly knowledge or to be grasped in defiled and unconcentrated consciousness. They are only to be penetrated or comprehended by those saints who have gained one of the six kinds of knowledge (ṣaḍabhijñāna) or those who have comprehended the āryan truths. For instance, the mental states (caitasika) of others can be known only by the saint who has acquired the power (ṛddhi) of knowing the mind of others (paracittajñāna). And the eternal laws (asaṃskṛtadharma) and incomprehensible or invisible matters (ajñāptirūpa) are only perceived by the saints who have comprehended the āryan truths. (Cf. V, 2; IX B, 3.) Fa-jên II, p. 45b.

The last phrase of this proposition in the Chinese is wanting in the Tibetan version. Cf. Wassiljew, p. 266.

3 The early Buddhists postulated the existence of three worlds—Kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu, or "the world of desire, of form and of absence of form." And they believed that individuals transmigrate from one of these to the other in accordance with the karmas. A question arose in connection with the space between the two worlds. They questioned: will there be any intermediate state of existence (antarābhava) between death (maraṇabhava 死 有) in one world and the next birth (upapattibhava

48. The Srotaāpannas can also attain the dhyāna.[1]

Such are the original doctrines held in common (among the members of the four schools).[2]

B. The later differentiated doctrines.

The later differentiated doctiines of the four schools are:—[3]

1. There exist as many different modes of comprehension (abhisamaya) as there exist the different aspects (ākāra) (lit. the differences of aspects of the āryan truths (āryasatyāni).[4]

2. There are certain things (少法 kecid dharmāḥ?) which are caused (lit. made) by (the agency of) self (svayaṁkṛta): there are certain things which are caused (by the agency of) others (parakṛta): there are certain things which are caused by both (ubhaya-

生有) in another world? The Sarvāstivādins and later Mahīśāsakas believed in its existence (cf. V, 25; IX B, 2) whereas the Mahāsaṃghikas and earlier Mahīśāsakas (IX A, 8) did not. The view of Mahāyānists is indefinite. According to them men of supreme virtue or great sinfulness receive no intermediate state; but others do. Cf. Fa-jên II, p. 47b.

There is no corresponding proposition in the Ch'in-lun.

[1] A proposition opposed to the teaching of the Sarvāstivādins. A Srotaāpanna, according to them, cannot attain the dhyāna because he is not free from desire (avirāga). But the Mahāsaṃghikas thought otherwise. A Srotaāpanna puts away all the saṃyojanas in the first āryan path (vide I A, 38). Therefore he is free from desire and can attain the dhyāna. Cf. Shu-chi II; Fa-jên II, p. 48a.

[2] One thing which arrests our attention on going through Vasumitra's work about the Mahāsaṃghika doctrines is that the Mahāsaṃghika doctrines as set forth by him contain several germs from which the later Mahāyāna doctrines may be derived. As I have observed already in p. 18, note 2 the Mahāyāna trikāya theory seems to have its origin in the sambhogakāya theory of the Mahāsaṃghikas, while the proposition No. 42 led to the development of the theory of causation of the universe by the absolute. The asaṃskṛta-dharma of the Sarvāstivādins has a static nature, that of the Mahāsaṃghikas a dynamic. (Cf. p. 28, note 3.) On this point the Mahāsaṃghikas must be considered as the precursors of the later Mahāyāna-thinkers.

[3] The following propositions, nine in all, seem to be those which came into existence many years after the establishment of the four schools, namely Mahāsaṃghika, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda and Kaukkuṭika. Did these later differentiated opinions arise only among the Mahāsaṃghikas? We find the following reading in the Ch'en-lun "The views of the Mahāsaṃghikas differed from those of the other three schools." The eading in the Tibetan version is almost the same as that in the Ch'en-lun on this point.

[4] 如如聖諦諸相差別 如是如是有別現觀

(Yathā yathāryasatyākāraviśeṣāh tathā tathābhisamayaviśeṣāḥ?)

This is a contradictory proposition to I A, 21 and means that the four āryan truths are to be meditated upon one after another, because each of them has a different aspect. Cf. p. 21, note 4.

kṛta?): there are certain things which are produced by (the conjunction of) several causes (pratitya-samutpanna).[1]

3. At one and the same time two minds (citta) can arise side by side.[2]

4. Both the path (mārga) and passions (kleśa) can exist (lit. are present) side by side.[3]

5. The karmas and vipākas (異 熟) exist simultaneously.[4]

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1 There are considerable differences among the three Chinese translations. The reading in the Ch'en-lun is as follows:—"(Certain) sufferings are caused (lit. made) by self, (certain) sufferings are produced by others; (certain) sufferings are caused by both (certain) sufferings are produced by (several) causes: (certain) sufferings are not produced by (several) causes." The reading in the Ch'in-lun:—"Some are caused by self: some are caused by others: some are produced by (several) causes."

Commentators who were evidently unable to grasp the meaning of the present proposition made several far-fetched interpretations. But they do not seem to merit our consideration. It seems to me this proposition refers to suffering as is suggested in the Ch'en-lun.

2 An interesting proposition from the psychological point of view. The early Buddhists divided the consciousness (vijñāna) into six, the first five of which are the five senses, while the last is the mind. The "two minds" referred to in this proposition seem to mean any two of the six consciousnesses. Therefore the two may be two sense perceptions or they may be our conceptual mind and a sense perception. The Vibhāṣā, X, says:—"The Mahāsaṃghikas maintained that two minds arise simultaneously in an individual (pudgala)." And again it (CXL) says:—"The two minds can arise simultaneously, because seeing, hearing and the other (mental performances) can take place simultaneously." Fa-jên III, p. 1a.

The T'ang-lun limits the number of "minds" to two, but there is no limitation in the Ch'en-lun which reads as follows: "Many minds can harmonize (saṃghāta) at one and the same time."

3 This is interpreted in the commentaries to mean that even when the āryan path is realized, passions, dormant by nature (anuśaya) can exist together with the path. It must be remembered here that the Mahāsaṃghikas divided the passions into two, *i. e.*, latent and active. The former have been called the anuśaya and the latter the paryavasthāna (vide I A, 44, p. 30, note 3). The passions which are referred to in this proposition are the former or the anuśayas.

An Arhant is supposed to be free from every sort of passions. Therefore this proposition must refer to a Buddhist saint in an early stage where he is capable of controlling the passions, but not able to annihilate the internal inclinations (anuśaya).

4 Here the word "karmas" signifies undoubtedly the potent legacies or bījas, to employ the technical term of the Vijñānavādins, of those "actions" good and bad, which originate in the three agencies, body, mouth and mind and not the actions them-selves as this term is commonly understood. These potent traces or legacies of action are bound to bring their results (vipāka). The existence of sentient beings (and even the whole universe according to the later Vijñānavādins) owes its origin to these potent legacies of the past actions.

6. The seed develops into the sprout (aṅkura).[1]

7. The material constituents of the sense-organs are subject to change (lit. the great seeds of the rūpendriyas have the meaning of change): the citta and caitasika-dharmas are not subject to change (lit. have no meaning of change).[2]

8. The mind permeates the (whole) body.[3]

9. The mind can contract and expand in accordance with the āśrayas and viṣayas.[4]

These later doctrines have further developed into numerous doctrines as the result of mutual differences of opinion.

The point of controversy in this proposition is the time-relation between the karmas and vipākas. The Sarvāstivādins and others insisted that the vipākas come into existence after the disappearance of the karmas while the Mahāsaṃghikas believed in the simultaneous existence of the karmas and vipākas. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 2a.

[1] This strange sounding proposition seems to give expression to the general principle that material things can continue to exist for a certain time without being subjected to momentary destruction. As we will see later on, the Sarvāstivādins insisted that all the saṃskāras are subject to momentary destruction. (V,41.) They did not admit evolution or change in things. The apparent evolution and change is according to them, the succession of the momentary creations and destructions of things.

The Shu-chi interprets this proposition in the following way:—"(The Mahāsaṃghikas) admit that rūpas (exist) for a long time without creation and destruction. Therefore the substances of seeds change and become sprouts: not that when the seeds are destroyed, the sprouts come into existence. Other schools (maintain that when) the seeds perish there come into being sprouts. Therefore (the view of the other schools) is not the same as the view of the Mahāsaṃghikas (lit. this). (It is on this account that the present proposition) is stated here." Cf. Fa-jên, III, p. 2a—b.

[2] "The great seeds of the rūpendriyas" in the T'ang-lun is translated in the Ch'en-lun as "the four great of the five sense-organs (indriyas)." (Six sense-organs in the text. But this must be a mistake for five sense-organs.) Herein "the four great" seems to mean the four great elements (catvāri mahābhūtāni)—pṛthivīdhātu, abdhātu, tejodhātu and vāyudhātu, or "the elements of earth, of water, of fire and of wind"—which constitute our physical body. Therefore "the great seeds of the rūpendriyas" signify undoubtedly the material constituents of an individual as distinct from spiritual constituents which are represented here by the citta and caitasika-dharmas. Cf. IX A, 20, p. 61, note 4.

[3] The following is the interpretation in the Shu-chi:—"The subtle mind-consciousness (manovijñāna) permeates the body on which it depends and abides (in it). It can perceive simultaneously a touching on the hand and a pricking in the foot. Therefore (we) know that the subtle mind-consciousness is everywhere present (lit. abides) in the body........"

[4] A proposition which shows us an original attitude of the Mahāsaṃghikas as to the Buddhist epistemology. The Shu-chi says:—"The Sarvāstivāda and other schools (lit. many schools) maintained that the āśrayas (所依 = indriyas or "sense-organs") and the ālambanas (所緣 = viṣayas or "objects of the mind") of the consciousnesses

II.

THE BAHUŚRUTĪYA SCHOOL

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Bahuśrutiya school:—

1. The teachings of the Buddha on the following five themes (lit. the five sounds of the Buddha) are the supermundane (*i. e*, fundamental) teachings (出世教 lokottara-śāsana) because (the teachings on) these five (themes) lead (a man to the attainment of) the path of emancipation (出離道 niḥsaraṇamārga).

a) Transitoriness (anityata),

b) Suffering (duḥkha),

c) Void (śūnya),

d) Non-ego (anātman),

e) Nirvāṇa, the quietude (śānta).

(vijñāna) are all fixed apriori (in rigid relation). The consciousnesses for the great viṣaya and small viṣaya and (the consciousnesses for) the great indriya and small indriya are all fixed apriori as to their combination. The consciousness which depends upon the small indriya cannot depend upon the great one. The consciousness which depends upon the great indriya cannot depend upon the small one. So also stand in rigid relationship the viṣayas to the consciousnesses (lit. their viṣayas are also so) . . . . . ."

For the formation of a perception or apperception three conditions are indispensable: 1. the presentation, 2. the perceiver and 3. the medium through which presentations appear. These three conditions the Buddhists call respectively the viṣaya (or ālambana), vijñāna (or citta) and indriya (or āśraya), or "the object, consciousness und sense-organs" Now according to the commentary the Sarvāstivādins are said to have believed in the existence of as many different combinations of these three as there exist different presentations. They are also said to have believed in the inalterability of these combinations. But this theory seems to have appeared highly implausible to the Mahāsaṃghikas because it leads to the conclusion of plurality of the mind. Like other schools the Mahāsaṃghikas divided consciousness into six classes according to the differences of the mediums through which presentations appear. But they did not admit the theory of plurality of mind consisting of separate entities. It is undoubtedly wrong when a commentator represents the Mahāsaṃghikas to have held a theory of plurality of mind in commenting on proposition I, B, 3. (Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 3a f.) The Mahāsaṃghikas maintained on the contrary that there is only one mind and this mind, they said, adapts itself to the various sense organs and objects.

This proposition is translated in the Tibetan version as follows: „So wird dieses und anderes als mit dem Objekt (ālambana) verbunden angenommen." (Translation—Walleser.) Does the expression „dieses und anderes" (this and other) correspond to the āśrayas and viṣayas in the Chinese version? Wassiljew's translation is somewhat different from that mentioned above. Cf. Der Buddhismus, p. 267.

The teachings of the Tathāgata on the themes other than the above (lit. the remaining sounds of the Tathāgata) are the mundane (*i. e.*, not fundamental) teachings (世間教 laukikaśāsana).[1]

2.

a) Arhants can (also) be tempted by others,

b) (They) have still ignorance,

c) (They) have also doubt,

d) (They) gain spiritual perception by the help of others,

e) The path is realized by utterances.[2]

As to the other views (abhiniveśa) they are, in the main, the same as those of the Sarvāstivāda school.

III.

THE PRAJÑĀPTIVĀDA SCHOOL.

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Prajñāptivāda school: —

1. Sufferings (duḥkha) are not the skandhas.[3]
2. The twelve āyatanas are not real (entities).[4]
3. The saṃskāras are provisionally called "suffering" (duḥkha), (when two saṃskāras) combine with each other (paramparasaṅghāta?):

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[1] From this proposition we learn that the Bahuśrutīyas divided all the teachings of the Buddha into two classes:—lokottara and laukika. The former aid the attainment of emancipation directly and are as such the fundamental doctrines whereas the latter aid indirectly, if at all, and are therefore not fundamental.

As we have seen before the Mahāsaṃghikas were of the opinion that all the speeches of the Buddha can be taken as "turning of the righteous law" (I A, 3) while the Sarvāstivādins contended that only the teaching as to the eight-fold path can be regarded as the fundamental doctrine and not all the teachings of the Buddha (V, 47). On this point the view of the Bahuśrutīyas resembles that of the Sarvāstivādins. Can this be taken as a reaction against the free interpretation of the Buddhistic canon on the part of the Mahāsaṃghikas, from which the Bahuśrutiyas had seceded?

[2] The five points of Mahādeva. (Cf. p. 15; I A, 28; IV, 3; VI, 5.)

[3] The Fa-jên says that the present proposition is aimed at the Sarvāstivādins who claim that sufferings are skandhas (cf. Fa-jên III, p. 6a). The Sanskrit "skandha" signifies etymologically multitude, group etc., but as a technical term it implies the five elements of a being. According to the Prajñāptivādins these elements have no potent power in themselves to cause suffering to a man. Suffering comes into being when two saṃskāras combine together. (Cf. III, 3, p. 37, note 1.)

[4] The twelve āyatanas or "the twelve places" are the six organs of sense and the six objects of sense. Both the sense-organs and objects are products of the aggregation of skandhas. (Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 7a.) Things which exist as the result of aggregation

(singly they) have no potent power (lit. man's function,—puruṣakāra) (to cause suffering).[1]

4. There is no (such thing as) untimely death: (every death is) the reuslt of past karmas.[2]

5. The karma develops into the cause (vipākahetu): (the cause) becomes (lit. pravartate) the fruit of vipāka (vipākaphala).[3]

6. By (the commission of) meritorious acts (lit. virtue,—puṇya) one attains the āryan path (ārya-mārga): the path is not to be arrived

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are not real entities: real entities must exist by themselves. According to this the only real entities are the five skandhas.

According to the Shu-chi the eighteen dhātus are also not real entities, because they are products of aggregation. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 7a f., where four different views of the early Buddhist thinkers on this point are described.

The reading of the present propositon in the Ch'en-lun is somewhat different from that in the T'ang-lun and runs as follows: "All the āyatanas are not accomplished." The Ch'in-lun reads almost the same as the Ch'en-lun; but the term "āyatana" is wanting in it. Wassiljew (p. 268) has rendered this proposition from the Tibetan version as: „Die Āyatanas sind unbegreifbar," (ma-rig-pa) whereas Walleser as: „Die (Sinnes-)Gebiete (āyatana) sind ohne Berührung" (ma-reg-pa).

[1] The saṃskāras singly have no potent power (puruṣakāra) to cause suffering. Suffering arises when certain saṃskātas, namely disagreeable conditions and the sense-organs come into contact with each other.

In opposition to this view other schools are said to have held the opinion that "man gets his retribution in accordance with the past karmas. This retribution has (in it) the potent power to inflict suffering (lit. this fruit has a function of affliction.)" Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 7b.

[2] The Fa-jên (III, p. 8b) tells us that the Sarvāstivādins admitted untimely death as is stated in the Vibhāṣā (XX, CLI), and Abhidharmakośa-śāstra (V). Therefore the present proposition may be looked upon as a counter proposition to that of the Sarvāstivādins.

[3] The karma, which is spoken of in this proposition is the karma-force or the so-called bījas, to use the Vijñānavāda technical term, and not the karma-actions.

The Point of controversy which led to this proposition is said in the Fa-jên to be the differences in the interpretation of the technical terms *vipāka-hetu* or "the cause of fruition" and *vipāka-karma* or "the actions which lead to fruition." It says: "The opinion of this school (*i. e.*, the Prajñaptivādins) is that the karma-force develops gradually and receives the name of vipāka-hetu just at the time of fruition. The vipāka-phala comes into being out of this vipāka-hetu (lit. whence). (But according to) the opinion of the Sarvāstivāda school the word "vipāka-hetu" is wide (in its denotation) and includes all the good and bad (actions) whereas the word "vipāka-karma" is narrow (in its sense) and confined only to the caitasika of will (cetanā) and the actions which were already made known and those which were not yet made known (jñāpti and ajñāpti-karma) . . . . ." Fa-jên III, p. 9a.

at through the cultivation of knowledge (lit. the path is not to be cultivated,—bhāvayitavya.)[1]

7. The path (when once attained) cannot be lost (lit. destroyed).[2]

As to the other doctrines they are, in the main, the same as the views of the Mahāsaṃghika school.

IV.

THE CAITYAŚAILA, APARAŚAILA & UTTARAŚAILA SCHOOLS

The original doctrines held in common by (the members of) the three schools, the Caityaśaila, the Aparaśaila and the Uttaraśaila:—

1. Bodhisattvas are not free from (metempsychosis into) the bad states of existence (durgati).[3]

2. Even if one makes offerings to a stūpa one cannot acquire great fruits.[4]

3. Arhants can also be tempted by others,[5] . . . . . .

These five points and the other doctrines are, in most cases, the same as those of the Mahāsaṃghika school.

V.

THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA SCHOOL

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Sarvāstivāda school:—

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[1] An interesting proposition from the historical point of view. As we see from this proposition, the Prajñāptivādius seem to have laid much importance on the benevolent actions, such as giving (dāna), discipline (śila) and so on. They thought that the cultivation of wisdom did not pave the way to the realization of the path or the attainment of the fourfold fruits of saintship. When we examine the later Mahāyāna literature, such as Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and so on, we find that the cultivation of virtue forms the essential work of a Bodhisattva. (Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 9a.)

[2] *I. e.*, the path which is attained by a Buddhist saint is eternal. This is a contrary view to that of the Sarvāstivādins. (Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 9b.)

[3] The interpretation in the Shu-chi is as follows:—"(They) have not attained the stage of kṣānti or "forbearance" (cf. p. 25, note 3). (They are) still average men (pṛthagjana). (They are) not free from being born into the bad states: therefore they are still born into them."

As we saw elsewhere the Mahāsaṃghikas held a view, that the Bodhisattvas are born into the bad states for the sake of salvation. (Cf. I A, 20.) We cannot fail to see by this the great differences of opinion between the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Caityaśaila and others.

[4] Cf. IX B, 7; X, 2; p. 64, note 2.

[5] The five points of Mahādeva. Cf. I A, 28; II, 2.

1. The (so-called) things (dharmas) which exist, according to (lit. of) the Sarvāstivāda school, are divided into two (classes): the first (by) nāma and second (by) rūpa.

The substances (of things) in the past and future are also (things which) really exist.[1])

2. All the dharmāyatanas can be known, can also be understood and can be attained.[2])

3. The (four) phenomena (catur lakṣaṇa),—birth (jāti), old age (jarā), staying (sthiti) and transitoriness (anityatā), (are those which) do not

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[1] The Sarvāstivādins are the Buddhist realists as is indicated by their name. But this does not warrant the assumption that they recognised the existence of all phenomena, as these appeal to our sense-perception. What they have insisted on is that the material and mental elements are things which really exist. This can be known from their acceptance of a generally espoused Buddhist doctrine, namely the non-existence-theory of entity-ego.

According to our text the phenomena in the universe are divided into two classes, *i. e.*, nāma and rūpa. The former signify the intangible things while the latter the tangible. In the classification of the five skandhas nāma includes the last four elements while rūpa is the first. It is, however, to be remembered here that the common grouping of the universal phenomena by the Sarvāstivādins is into five classes and not into two as Vasumitra tells us here. The five are: 1. citta, 2. caitasika, 3. rūpa, 4. visamprayukta-saṃskāra and 5. asaṃskṛta, or "1. the mind, 2. the accompanying states, 3. matter, 4. things which are neither material nor mental and 5. the things which transcend the law of causation." The five are again subdivided into seventy-five. Thus the universal phenomena are divided into seventy-five subclasses in five groups (五位七十五法). The Sarvāstivādins recognised that the seventy-five elements are existing elements throughout the past, present and future. This view of seventy-five dharmas which are existing elements, not only in the present, but even in the past and future, was supported by the later Mahīśāsakas (IX B, 1) but opposed by the Mahāsaṃghikas and also the earlier Mahīśāsakas. (Cf. I A, 45; IX A, 1.)

The reading of this proposition in the Ch'in-lun is almost the same as that in the T'ang-lun, but that in the Ch'en-lun differs considerably from the above two translations and is far from being clear. The following is my tentative translation of the Ch'en-lun:

"All (things) exist: (all are) real things (?) (lit. suchness). There are two such dharmas (as nāma and rūpa?) (and) they include all (things which exist).

(The things in) the past, present and future exist.

(This existence-theory) is based on 1. the right tradition, 2. (the existence of) two dharmas, 3. the existence of (mental) objects and 4. the existence of the fruits (even after the disappearance of actions)."

[2] The same view as that of the later Mahīśāsakas, but different from that of the Mahāsaṃghikas (cf. I A, 46 and p. 31, note 2, IX B, 3).

combine with the mind (citta-visamprayukta) and fall under (the category of) the saṃskāra-skandha.[1]

4. The aggregated things (saṃskṛta-vastūni) are of three kinds:[2] the unaggregated things (asaṃskṛta-vastūni) are also of three kinds.[3] The three aspects (lakṣaṇa) of impermanence[4] have their own special substances. (Of the four āryan truths) three truths (satya)[5] are (concerned with) impermanence, one truth[6] with permanence.

5. The four āryan truths are to be meditated upon one after another (lit. gradually).[7]

6. Man can enter (the stage of) the samyaktva-nyāma through (practising) the two (kinds of) meditation (samādhi),[8] voidness (空 śūnyatā) and non-desire (無願 apraṇihita); (that is to say) one gets into the samyaktva-nyāma through meditation on (the truth of suffering in the world of) desire (kāma-loka) (in four different ways).[9]

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1 The reading in the Ch'eu-lun is as follows: "Birth, old age, staying and transitoriness are saṃskāras. (They) belong to (the category of) saṃskāraskandha, which do not combine with the mind." The Ch'in-lun seems to have lost a complementary sentence: we find there only the phrase: "birth, staying and destruction."

According to the ˢShu-chi this proposition is directed against the Sautrāntikas, who do not postulate such a category of visaṃprayukta-dharma *i. e.*, "things which are neither material nor mental." (Cf. ˢShu-chi; ˌFa-jên III, p. 11 b f.)

2 *I. e.*, the impermanent things in the past, present and future.

3 *I. e.*, Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha and ākāśa. (Cf. I A, 41, p. 28, note 3; IX A, 19.)

4 Birth, change and destruction.

5 duḥkha-satya, samudaya-satya and mārga-satya.

6 nirodha-satya.

7 The Abhidharmakośa-śāstra (chap. VI; chin. tr. XXIII) has preserved an interesting discussion on this problem. As to the view of other schools as they are set forth in the present work cf. I A, 21; I B, 1; IX A, 2 and the notes on them.

8 In the Ch'en-lun: mokṣamukha. The Ch'in-lun has, however, no word corresponding to this term; it enumerates only the following three specific names:—śūnyatā, animitta (無相) and apraṇihita, the three terms which are described as the three mokṣas in the Mahāvyutpatti. But the animitta in the Ch'in-lun seems to be an erroneous interpolation, not only because its equivalent cannot be found in the two other versions, it is also quite superfluous. Vide note 9.

9 According to the ˌFa-jên (III, p. 13a) this proposition is directed against the view of the Dharmaguptikas, who hold that the animitta-samādhi (cf. note 8) is the only samādhi through the practice of which man can enter the samyaktva-nyāma.

The Abhidharmakośa-śāstra (Chap. VI; chin. tr. XXIII) tells us that a Buddhist who has completed the course of preliminary sanctification, ending in the laukikāgradharma can enter the samyaktva-nyāma or the first stage of darśana-mārga by meditating on suffering in the world of desire in the four different ways in accordance with its so-called four different aspects (ākāra). The so-called four aspects are duḥkha, amitya, śūnya and

When (one has) already entered into the samyaktva-nyāma (one is) called a "repairer" (pratipannaka) during (the stay) in the (first) fifteen stages (lit. minds) (of the darśana-mārga) and (when one enters) the 16th stage (lit. mind) an "abider-in-the-fruit" (phalastha).[1]

7. The laukikāgradharma (or "*stage called* the highest worldly law") is a stage lasting but a moment (lit. a *moment* mind,—*ekakṣaṇika*-citta). There are three kinds (varga) of laukikāgradharma. (One who has arrived at this stage) never falls away (from it).[2]

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anātmaka or "suffering, transitoriness, voidness and non-ego." The first kind of abstract meditation mentioned in the present proposition, *i. e.*, śūnyatā-samādhi, is interpreted in the 'Shu-chi to be the meditation on śūnya and anātmaka, the second kind, *i. e.*, apraṇihita-samādhi to be the meditation on duḥkha and anitya.

1 The path of the sanctification of a Buddhist saint is divided in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra into two, *i. e.* darśana-mārga (見 道) and bhāvanā-mārga (修 道), or "the path where a Buddhist saint sees the truth which he has not yet seen" and "the path where a Buddhist saint rehearses what he has attained." The samyaktva-nyāma is the first stage of the darśana-mārga (Cf. p. 27, note 3). This darśana-mārga is again subdivided into a number of sub-stages. This subdivision arises from the progressive meditation on the four-fold āryan truths in the sixteen different ways which results in the acquisition of the sixteen knowledges. A Buddhist saint who has completed the course of the preliminary sanctification meditates first on the truth of suffering in the world of desire. As the result of this meditation there accrues the so-called 1. duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti (苦 法 智 忍), which is followed by the 2. duḥkhe dharmajñāna (苦 法 智). After the acquisition of this knowledge a Buddhist saint meditates on suffering in the rūpa-and arūpa-dhātus. This meditation results in the acquisition of 3. duḥkhe 'nvayajñānakṣānti (苦 類 智 忍), which is followed by (4) duḥkhe 'nvayajñāna (苦 類 智). In a similar way he is required to meditate on the remaining three āryan truths and acquires correspondingly the following twelve kinds of knowledge; namely: 5. samudaye dharmajñānakṣānti, 6. samudaye dharmajñāna, 7. samudaye 'nvayajñānakṣānti, 8. samudaye 'nvayajñāna, 9. nirodhe dharmajñānakṣānti, 10. nirodhe dharmajñāna, 11. nirodhe 'nvayajñānakṣānti, 12. nirodhe 'nvayajñāna, 13. mārge dharmajñānakṣānti, 14. mārge dharmajñāna, 15. mārge 'nvayajñānakṣānti, 16. mārge 'nvayajñāna. These kinds of knowledge which form the stages of progressive meditation are technically called the sixteen mind-moments (十 六 心 刹 那, ṣoḍaśa citta-kṣaṇāḥ). (Cf. Mah. v., Abhidharmakośa-śāstra chap. VI, chin. tr. XXIII.) Of these so-called sixteen states of mind the first fifteen constitute, according to the Sarvāstivādins, the fifteen sub-stages of the darśana-mārga, the last, namely mārge 'nvayajñāna being the entrance into the bhāvanā-mārga. The Sarvāstivādins call the man who is in the first fifteen stages a "repairer" (pratipannaka) and the man who has attained at the 16th stage an "abider-in-the-fruit" (phalastha).

For the similar proposition of the Vātsīputrīyas cf. VII, 8 and p. 56, note 2.

2 The laukikāgradharma is the highest or the last stage in the course of preliminary sanctification (cf. p. 25, note 3). The Sarvāstivādins considered the sojourn of a Buddhist in this stage to be a moment, contrary to the view of the Mahāsaṃghikas. One who has entered this stage is supposed to pass immediately into the first stage of sanctification of Buddhist saints. Therefore there is no possibility of retrogression.

8. A Srotaāpanna has no chance (lit. meaning) for retrogression (vinivartana), (while) an Arhant has.[1]

9. Not all the Arhants can gain the anutpāda-jñāna (or "the knowledge of non-re-birth)."[2]

10. (Even) an average man (pṛthagjana) is able to destroy greed (rāga) and anger (pratigha) (in the world of) desire (kāmadhātu.)[3]

11. (Even) heretics (tīrthika) can gain the five supernatural powers (ṛddhi).[4]

12. There are also certain devas who lead a holy life (brahmacaryāvasthita).[5]

As to the three kinds of the laukikāgradharma we find two sets of interpretations given in the 'Shu-chi. According to the first of them the three kinds signify 1. the laukikāgradharma for the men of Bauddha-yāna, 2. the laukikāgradharma for the men of Pratyeka-yāna and 3. the laukikāgradharma for the men of Śrāvaka-yāna. (Cf. 'Shu-chi; ,Fa-jên III, p. 14.)

1 Lit. A Srotaāpanna has no meaning of retrogression, while an Arhant has. (Cf. p. 26, note 1.)

2 The anutpādajñāna is one of the two kinds of transcendental knowledge (prajñā) which is always present in a Buddha, the other being the kṣayajñāna. Anutpādajñāna is the cognizance of an Arhant that he will not be subjected to rebirth (an-utpāda) in the future, kṣayajñāna the cognizance that the suffering which he acquired in accordance with his past karmas is eternally destroyed (kṣaya). The Mahāsaṃghikas thought that these two kinds of knowledge were the two phases of one and the same transcendental knowledge, but the Sarvāstivādins thought them to be two different kinds of knowledge.

The present proposition signifies that the Arhants of higher capability can possess both kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna, while Arhants of lower capability have only kṣayajñāna. The Arhants who are subject to retrogression cannot have anutpādajñāna. Cf. ,Fa-jên III, p. 14.

3 A view contrary to that of the Mahīśāsakas. (Cf. IX A, 5.)

4 As to the five supernatural powers cf. Wassiljew p. 272, note 3.

This subject seems to have been much discussed by the early Ābhidharmikas of different schools. The schools which conceded the possibility of gaining the five supernatural powers to the heretics are the Sarvāstivāda and Vātsīputrīya (V, 11; VII 4). The schools which did not concede this are the Haimavata, Mahīśāsaka and Dharmaguptika. (Cf. VI, 3; IX, A 6; X, 4.)

5 It is said that the six celestial regions of the world of desire (kāma-dhātu) (cf. p. 43, note 1; table I, 2) are peopled by celestial beauties who are the sources of temptation to the devas or the sentient beings who are born into them. It is commonly believed that the devas cannot lead a holy life on account of temptation. Nevertheless the Sarvāstivādins seem to have believed, as the present proposition says, that some devas led a moral life. The Ābhidharmikas who held a contrary view to this are the Haimavata VI, 4) and Mahīśāsakas (IX A, 7). Cf. 'Shu-chi; ,Fa-jên III, p. 15a ff.

13. The bodhyaṅgas (or "the requisites for the attainment of spiritual perfection") are to be acquired (only) in the seven samāpattis (等 至, or the states attainded by practicing the ecstatic meditation) and not in the other samāpattis.[1]

[1] The bodhyaṅgas (sometimes: sambodhyaṅga) (or "members of bodhi") are the requisites for the attainment of the supreme knowledge or buddhahood. These requisites are seven in number, namely:

1. smṛtisambodhyaṅgam	(念 覺 支)	or "recollection or memory",
2. dharmapravicaya°	(擇 法 — —)	or "investigation",
3. vīrya°	(精 進 — —)	or "energy",
4. prīti°	(喜 — —)	or "joy",
5. praśrabdhi°	(輕 安 — —)	or "calmness",
6. samādhi°	(定 — —)	or "contemplation",
7. upekṣā°	(捨 — —)	or "equanimity".

Cf. Mah. v. and Childers.

Samāpatti (or "attainment" or "equally arrived" in the *Hsüan-chwang* version) is a synonym for a state induced by the practice of ecstatic meditation. There are altogether eight samāpattis, the first four samāpattis being the four dhyānas in the rūpa-dhātu and the last four being the four brahma-lokas in the arūpa-dhātu. The seven samāpattis which are mentioned in our text are interpreted in the Shu-chi to mean the four dhyānas in the rūpa-dhātu and the first three brahma-lokas in the arūpa-dhātu. (Cf. the table which follows.)

The point of controversy in the present proposition is as to whether the seven bodhyaṅgas can be found in all the eight samāpattis and also in the kāma-dhātu or not. The Sarvāstivādins were, as the present proposition shows, of the opinion that they can only be acquired in the seven samāpattis while other schools maintained that they can also be acquired even in the last samāpatti of the arūpa-dhātu and also in the kāma-dhātu. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 15b.

The table of the Buddhist cosmology which is prepared on the basis of the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra chapter III.

I. Kāma-dhātu (or "the world of desire").
- 1.
  - Naraka
  - Tiryag-yoni
  - Preta
  - Manuṣya
- 2. Deva-loka
  - Caturmahārāja-kāyika
  - Trayastriṃśa
  - Yāma
  - Tuṣita
  - Nirmāṇarati
  - Paranirmitavaśavartin

14. All the dhyānas (靜 慮) are included in the smṛtyupasthānas (念 住).[1]

- II. Rūpa-dhātu (or "the world of form").
  - 1. Prathama-dhyāna
    - a) Brahma-pariṣadya
    - b) Brahma-purohita
    - c) Mahābrahma
  - 2. dvitīya-dhyāna
    - a) Parīttābha
    - b) Āpramāṇābha
    - c) Ābhāsvara
  - 3. tṛtīya-dhyāna
    - a) Parīttaśubha
    - b) Apramāṇaśubha
    - c) Śubhakṛtsna
  - 4. caturtha-dhyāna
    - a) Anabhraka
    - b) Puṇyaprasava
    - c) Bṛhatphala
    - d) Avṛha
    - e) Atapa
    - f) Sudṛśa
    - g) Sudarśana
    - h) Akaniṣṭha
  - (all of the above:) Brahma-loka
- III. Arūpa-dhātu (or "the formless world")
  - 1. Ākāśānantyāyatana
  - 2. Vijñānānantyāyatana
  - 3. Ākiñcanyāyatana
  - 4. Naivasañjñāsañjñāyatana
  - (all of the above:) Catur-arūpa-brahma-loka

[1] Dhyāna or "an abstract meditation" is the principal means of entering into the samyaktva-nyāma (Cf. V, 15). A man who exercises dhyāna can also obtain his rebirth after death in one of the Brahma-heavens, the particular heaven being determined by the degree of dhyāna which he has attained. There are four "fundamental" dhyānas which are the succeeding stages of the meditation. A Buddhist who is desirous of practising dhyāna is required first to retire to a quiet place and then to concentrate his mind upon a certain subject. As the meditation advances his mind is gradually filled with supernatural joy (prīti) and delight (sukha) being detached from earthly emotions, but it is not free from reasoning (vitarka) upon, and investigation (vicāra) of, the subject chosen for meditation. This is the characteristic of the first dhyāna. But when the meditation advances his mind becomes free from reasoning and investigation, yet the feelings of supernatural joy and delight remain. This is the state in the second dhyāna. When he continues, however, to meditate upon the same subject he gets free from the feeling of joy. This is the third dhyāna. In the fourth dhyāna his mind will become indifferent (upekṣā) to all the feelings (vedanā), alike of pleasure and of pain. According to the Fa-jên "all the dhyānas" mentioned in the text are these four fundamental dhyānas. (As to the four dhyānas cf. Abhidharmakośa-śāstra chap. VIII, chin. tr. XXVIII an also p.45, note 1.)

Smṛtyupasthāna or "fixing of the attention" is also a kind of meditation by the practise of which a Buddhist acquires insight into the truth (vipaśyanā). (Cf. p. 25, note 3.)

15. A man can enter the samyaktva-nyāma and can also gain Arhantship (lit. the fruit of—) independently of the (four fundamental) dhyānas.[1]

16. Although a man can gain Arhantship (lit. the fruit of—) yet he cannot enter the samyaktva-nyāma, if the body is in the world of form or the formless world (lit. depending upon the body of the rūpa- or arūpa-dhātu). A man can enter the samyaktva-nyāma, as well as gain Arhantship (if) the body is in the world of desire (kāma-dhātu).[2]

17. There is no one who is free from passion (virāga) in the Northern

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There are four smṛtyupasthānas corresponding to the four different subjects of meditation. The four subjects are: the body (kāya), sensation (vedanā), thought (citta) and the existences other than the above three (dharma). A Buddhist is required to meditate upon them correspondingly as impure, painful, transitory and non-ego. Cf. Abhidharma-kośaśastra chap. VI, chin. tr. XXIII.

Now the present proposition says that all the dhyānas are included in the smṛtyupasthānas. Does this signify that the subjects of meditation of the four fundamental dhyānas are included in the four subjects of the smṛtyupasthānas? We have, unfortunately, no explanation of this proposition in the 'Shu-chi and the explanation in the ˌFa-jên is not quite to the point.

[1] According to the ˌFa-jên this proposition is said to give expression to the idea of the Sarvāstivādins that a man can enter the samyaktva-nyāma "depending on the anāgamya (未至定), antara (中間定) and the four fundamental (mūla—根本定) (dhyānas)." That is to say the entrance into the samyaktva-nyāma is not necessarily induced by the four fundamental stages of mystic meditation: a man can enter it directly even from the stages of mystic meditation, known as the anāgamya-dhyāna and antara-dhyāna. What then do these two dhyānas signify? Each of the four fundamental dhyānas which we have already seen in the preceding note has a preparatory stage, known as sāmantaka-dhyāna or "neighbouring dhyāna." (As to the three sub-divisions of the four dhyānas in the Pāli-sources cf. Childers.) The anāgamya-dhyāna which is mentioned in the ˌFa-jên is the synonym of the sāmantaka-dhyāna of the first dhyāna. According to the Abhidharmakośa (chap. VIII, chin. tr. XXVIII) it is said that there is an intermediate stage of meditation between the first fundamental dhyāna and the sāmantaka-dhyāna of the second. Because it lies between the two it is called antara-dhyāna or "intermediate (stage of) meditation." The characteristic in this intermediate stage is that though the mind of the man who exercises dhyāna is free from reasoning (vitarka), it is not free from investigation (vicāra) into the subject which is chosen for meditation. (Cf. p. 44, note 1; Abhidharmakośa-śāstra Chap. VIII, chin. tr. XXVIII.) The antara-dhyāna in the ˌFa-jên refers to this intermediate stage.

According to the ˌFa-jên the Bodhisattvas and Pratyekas are said to enter the samyaktva-nyāma always from the fourth dhyāna. (Cf. ˌFa-jên III, p. 16a.)

[2] *I. e.*, only an individual in the world of desire (kāma-dhātu) can enter into the samyaktva-nyāma or the first stage of darśanamārga and not those who are in the world of form or the formless world (rūpa- and arūpa-dhātu).

Kuru continent. No saint is born there or in the unconscious heaven (asaṃjñā-devaloka).[1]

18. The four consecutive ranks (lit. fruits) of priesthood (catur-śrāmaṇa-phala) are not necessarily attained one after another (lit gradually). If one has already entered the samyaktva-nyāma one can (directly) attain the ranks of Sakṛdāgāmin and Anāgāmin (lit. realize the fruits of—) thanks to (the previous destruction of passions in) the worldly path (laukika mārga).[2]

19. It may be said that the four smṛty-upasthānas can include all the dharmas.[3]

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[1] The northern Kuru continent (Uttarakuru) is one of the four continents in the Buddhist cosmology. According to the Buddhist literature this continent is said to be the land of pure happiness. No suffering is known in this land. Therefore there is no one who aspires to the realization of the path and becomes free from passion. Therefore no saint desires rebirth into an environment so detrimental to his pursuit of the realization of the truth.

The unconscious heaven or asaṃjñā-devaloka is the highest devaloka in the arūpa-dhātu. This heaven is known to be the heaven of long life and happiness. It is supposed, therefore, that no one in this heaven tries to cultivate the path. Hence Buddhist saints are described to have no desire for rebirth into this world. Cf. ˊShu-chi; ˏFa-jên III, p. 16 b.

[2] The "four fruits of priesthood" means the four ranks of the Buddhist saints (ārya-pudgala), namely the ranks of 1. Srotaāpanna, 2. Sakṛdāgāmin, 3. Anāgāmin and 4. Arhant.

This proposition gives expression to a Sarvāstivāda view that the acquisition of the four ranks is not necessarily followed one after another. One may be able to acquire a higher rank at once, skipping over certain lower ranks. According to the ˛Fa-jên the skipping over may be done in two ways. The first is to skip over the first rank and acquire directly the second rank, namely that of Sakṛdāgāmin. In this case the darśana-mārga (cf. p. 41, note 1) is regarded as the path for the Buddhist saint who is in the preparatory rank for Sakṛdāgāmin, *i.e.*, sakṛdāgāmi-pratipannaka. The second case of skipping over is to surpass the first two ranks and attain immediately the third, namely the rank of Anāgāmin. In this case the darśana-mārga becomes the path for a Buddhist saint who is in the preparatory rank for Anāgāmin, *i. e.*, anāgāmi-pratipannaka. Such skipping over is due, according to the Sarvāstivādins, to the previous destruction of certain passions which are to be destroyed in the bhāvanā-mārga, before the entrance into the samyaktvanyāma (*i. e.*, the "worldly paths" of our text). A Buddhist who has previously destroyed six kinds of passions acquires at once the rank of Sakṛdāgāmin, one who has destroyed nine kinds the rank of Anāgāmin. It should be noted here that though the Sarvāstivādins granted the skipping over the first two ranks, yet they did not allow the skipping over the first three. No Buddhist saint can acquire at once Arhantship.

According to the ˛Fa-jên this proposition is aimed at the Sautrāntikas who did not admit the destruction of passions in the worldly paths. Cf. ˛Fa-jên III, p. 16b.

[3] As we saw in p. 44, note 1 the smṛtyupasthāna consists essentially in the fourfold meditations. As such the subjective "substance" of the smṛtyupasthāna must be

20. All the anuśayas (dormant passions) are caitasika: (they) combine with the mind (cittasamprayukta). (Therefore they can also become) objects of thought (ālambana).[1]

21. All the anuśayas can be included in (the category of) the paryavasthāna; (but) all the paryavasthānas cannot be included in (the category of) the anuśaya.[2]

22. The law of causation (pratītya-samutpādāṅgikatva) is undoubtedly saṃskṛta.[3]

23. An Arhant is still governed by certain categories of the law of causation (pratityasamutpādaṅga). (lit. Certain "members of dependent causation" also follow after (anuvṛt) an Arhant).[4]

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considered to be the citta which is known as intellect (prajñā). According to Buddhism citta is bound to be followed by its caitasika. When an intellect begins to work there arise several other mental states in accordance with the law of association. The Abhidharmakośa calls the first pure intellect the svabhāva-smṛty-upasthāna (自性念住) and that which exists together with the caitasikas the saṃsarga-smṛtyupasthāna (相雜念住). (The latter is called in the 'Shu-chi the parivāra 眷屬.) The subjective intellect presupposes its objects. These objects are styled in the above authority the ālambana-smṛty-upasthāna (所緣念住). (Cf. Abhidharmakośa chap. VI; chin. tr. XXIII.) Judging from the notes in the 'Shu-chi and the Fa-jên this proposition seems to mean that all the things in the universe are included in one or the other of the above three categories of smṛtyupasthānas. (Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 17 a.)

1 A proposition in opposition to that of the Mahāsaṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas. Cf. I A, 43 and p. 30, note 2; IX A, 3.

2 For the views of the Mahāsaṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas on a similar subject, cf. I A, 44 and p. 30, note 3; IX A, 4.

3 Cf. I A, 41b, and p. 28, note 3; IX A, 19i.

4 Pratītya-samutpāda is a well-known formula which sums up the causes of existence in twelve categories (lit. members—aṅga). The twelve are: — 1. avidyā, 2. saṃskāra, 3. vijñāna, 4. nāma-rūpa, 5. ṣaḍāyatana, 6. sparśa, 7. vedanā, 8. tṛṣṇā, 9. upadāna, 10. bhava, 11. jāti, 12. jarā-maraṇa, or "ignorance, actions, consciousness, composite organism, six organs of sense, contact, sensation, desire, attachment, becoming, birth and decay-death." According to the Buddha all sentient beings transmigrate from one world to the other being governed by these twelve categories of causation. Now an Arhant is supposed to have destroyed all the causes for the future existence. Is he then no longer bound by any categories of the law of causation? The Sarvāstivādins thought, as the present proposition tells us, that an Arhant is still governed by certain categories of the law of causation. Then, which are such categories? According to the 'Shu-chi the categories, "ignorance, desire, attachment" no longer govern an Arhant, because he is free from them. So also are the categories, "birth and decay-death," which are only applicable to those who sobject to transmigration. The second category, namely saṃskāra or "actions" is the past cause which gives rise to present suffering: naturally it cannot bind an Arhant. The tenth category or "becoming" is the cause of the future existence. An Arhant does not perform any actions which bring

24. (Certain) Arhants can perform (lit. have) meritorious deeds which may lead to (lit. develop to) (worldly happiness) (virūḍha puṇyakriyā).[1]

25. Only in the worlds of desire and of form (kāma- and rūpa-dhātu) is there certainly an intermediate state of existence (antara-bhava).[2]

26. The five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānakāya), (that of) the eye and so forth, (conduce to) passion (sarāga); (they) do not (conduce to) freedom from passion (virāga).[3]

(Their functions are) only to perceive (lit. to take) the individual aspects (svalakṣaṇa) (of their external correlatives): (they have) no thinking (faculty) (avikalpa) at all.

27. The citta and caitasika dharmas are different entities.[4]

28. The objects (ālambana) of the citta and caitasika dharmas really exist (lit. the citta and caitasika dharmas have surely their objects).

29. The svabhāva does not combine with (samprayuj) the svabhāva: the citta does not combine with the citta.[5]

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future retribution. Therefore the tenth category also is not applicable to an Arhant. Vijñāna or the third category means in its ordinary sense "consciousness," but as a technical term in the twelve causation theory it signifies a substance of transmigration at the moment when it has entered into mothers' womb. In this state of existence there are neither consciousness in the ordinary sense nor sense-organs. Therefore this category cannot bind an Arhant. Our inquiry comes now to the question whether the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh categories, namely "composite organism, six organs of sense, contact and sensation" govern an Arhant or not. The [5]Shu-chi has preserved two answers to this question. According to the first these four categories still govern an Arhant, while according to the second only the seventh, namely "sensation," can influence him. Cf. [5]Shu-chi III; [4]Fa-jên III, p. 17 b ff.

[1] Cf. IX A, 9.

[2] The Mahāsaṃghikas and earlier Mahīśāsakas contradict this proposition. (Cf. I A, 47 and p. 31, note 3; IX A, 8.) But this view was supported by the later Mahīśāsakas. (Cf. IX B, 2.)

[3] Cf. I A, 22 and p. 22, note 1; VII, 5; IX A, 10.

[4] Lit. each of the substances of the citta and caitasika dharmas exists really. A proposition in opposition to that of the Sautrāntikas, who do not recognise the substance of caitasika dharma as distinct from that of citta dharma. (Cf. [4]Fa-jên III, p. 19 b.)

[5] A proposition which gives expression to the law of association. According to the Sarvāstivādins the citta forms the centre of our mental activity. Mental activity is possible by the association of different caitasikas with the cittas. In this association things of the same kind cannot combine, just as a sword cannot cut itself. The citta combines with the caitasika, vedanā and so on, but it does not combine with another citta. Similarly one vedanā does not combine with another vedanā. The Mahāsaṃghikas are said to have admitted the combination of things of the same kind. Cf. [4]Fa-jên III, p. 20a.

30. There is worldly right view (laukikasamyagdṛṣṭi) (and also) worldly power of faith (laukikaśraddhendriya).[1]

31. There are things which are indeterminate (avyākṛta-dharma).[2]

32. For Arhants there are things which are no longer to be learnt and things which are (still) to be learnt (naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa-dharma).[3]

33. Arhants all gain the (four fundamental) dhyānas: they cannot all (however), realize (lit. manifest, — abhivyaṃj) (the fruition of) dhyāna.[4]

34. Arhants are not yet free from (the influence of) the past karmas (故 業) (lit. the Arhants enjoy (bhuj) still the past actions).[5]

35. (Even) average men (pṛthagjana) (can) die in a good state of mind (lit. abiding in a good mind).[6]

36. No man ever dies in the state of the samāhita (or "abstract meditation").[7]

37. The Buddha and the two vehicles have no differences as to emancipation (vimukti): the Āryan paths (mārga) of the three vehicles (however), differ from one another.[8]

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1 For the Mahāsaṃghika and Mahīśāsaka views, cf. I A, 36 and p. 27, note 1; IX A, 13.

2 Cf. I A, 37 and p. 27, note 2.

3 The Sanskrit naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa is mentioned in the Mahāvyutpatti as a synouym of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa paryāya). But the supercommentary Fa-jên (III, p. 20a) says: . . . "Of the naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa-dharma there are two kinds: the first is asaṃskāra and the second sāsrava. Here sāsrava is meant."

4 The Fa-jên interprets this proposition as follows:—The four fundamental dhyānas can be obtained by the destruction of the nine kinds of passions in the world of desire without making any special effort (prayoga) of meditation. "Though the Aśaikṣa saints can gain dhyāna, yet there are differences of abhivyakti (or "manifestation") (現 起) and anabhivyakti (or "non-manifestation"). It is not known, however, in opposition to what school this proposition is made." Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 20a.

5 In the Vibhāṣā (vol. CXXV) an Arhant is said to have suffered from emprisonment. Such may be taken as an instance of this law. (Cf. Fa-jên, vol. III, p. 20a ff.)

6 The Sarvāstivādins are said to have insisted that the states of mind at the time of death may be good, bad or neutral. Even average men can die in a good state of mind. It is not, however, known exactly if other schools insisted that an average man cannot die in a good state of mind. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 20b.

In the Tibetan version this proposition is stated quite differently: its reading is the same as that in the Ch'in-lun. Cf. Wassiljew, p. 275.

7 *I. e.*, all men die in a disturbed state of mind (kṣipta-citta).

8 There is no corresponding proposition to this in the Tibetan version nor in the Ch'in-lun. Wassiljew thought this to be an interpolation of the later Mahāyānists. (Cf. Wassiljew, p. 275, note 4.) But he is entirely wrong in this supposition. This is one of the doctrines of the Vaibhāṣikas and not that of Mahāyāna. The Vaibhāṣikas

38. Sentient beings are not the objects (ālambana) of goodwill (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā) and so forth on the part of the Buddha. If any one adheres (to the view) that there are sentient beings he cannot realize his emancipation (mukti).[1]

39. The Bodhisattvas must still be considered (lit. be said) average men (pṛthagjana): their bonds (saṃyojana) are not yet destroyed. Unless one has entered into the samyaktvanyāma one cannot be said (lit. called) to have passed beyond (vikrānta) the level of the average men (pṛthagjanabhūmi).[2]

40. (The term) "sentient being" (sattva) is a provisional name (which is applied to) the actual continuation (santāna) of upādāna (有執受).[3]

41. All the saṃskāras are said to perish at every moment.[4]

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maintained that as to the final goal the three vehicles are the same (Vibhāṣā vol. XXXI), while as to the mode of realization there are some differences, just as the three beasts, the horse, the hare and the elephant cannot cross a river in the same manner. Cf. Vibhāṣā vol. CXLIII and Fa-jên III, p. 21 a.

Against this Sarvāstivāda view the Mahīśāsakas held the opinion that there is no difference between the three vehicles as to either emancipation or as to Āryan paths (IX A, 22), while the Dharmaguptikas (X, 3) supported the view of the Sarvāstivādins.

1 Deest in the Tibetan and the Ch'in-lun.

As is well-known, one of the important doctrines of Buddhism is a theory of non-ego. If there is no ego at all, what are the objects of the compassion, benevolence and so on of the Buddha? The answer of the Sarvāstivādins is that the object of compassion and so on is not the entity-sentience, but the continuation (santāna) of the skandhas which constitute it. Evidently this proposition is directed against the Vātsīputrīyas who insist on the existence of a certain ego. (Cf. VII, 1.)

2 The Mahāsaṃghikas call the Bodhisattvas who have entered into the second kalpa "holy men," but the Sarvāstivādins regard even those Bodhisattvas in the last stage as average men, because they have not entered into the samyaktvanyāma. (Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 21a). According to the Sarvāstivādins a Buddhist can attain the transformation of personality by entering into the first stage of the darśana-mārga, *i.e.* samyaktvanyāma. At this stage he becomes a saint, relinquishing the personality of the average man. (Cf. Abhidharmakośa VI, chin. tr. XXIII.) The Haimavata held the same opinion as the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. VI, 1.

3 Lit. sentient beings are provisionally established only by the actual continuation of upādāna.

Upādāna is interpreted in the Fa-jên to signify the citta and caitasika which hold the sense proper and the sense-organs. If so, does this proposition signify that the term sentient being is a provisional name which is given to the combined continuation of the material and spiritual elements? In any case this proposition seems to give expression to anātman-theory and as such this must be understood as opposed to the pudgala-theory of the Vātsīputrīyas. (VII, 1.)

4 Wassiljew has understood saṃskāra in the sense of karman and translated it as „Handlungen". But this is evidently false. Here this term means the saṃskṛta-dharmas

42. It is certain that nothing can transmigrate from one world to the other (lit. from the former world to the later). The laukika-pudgalas are said to transmigrate; (but) this (only) applies to (lit. belongs to) the saṃskāras during a man's life-time.

In the nirupadhiśeṣa (or "the nirvāṇa of complete annihilation") there exist no skandhas to be transmuted.[1]

43. There are (four) transcendental abstract meditations (lokottara-dhyāna).[2]

44. There is also vitarka (or "reasoning") which is not connected with human passion (anāsrava).[3]

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or "aggregated things." The present proposition signifies that the saṃskāras continue to exist while being perished and recreated at every moment. This theory of perpetual destruction and recreation of matter is counted as one of the most important doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins and as such caused a great controversy amongst the early Ābhidharmikas. Cf. p. 54, note 2.

[1] A proposition which gives expression to the non-existence theory of entity ego and entity dharma (ātmanairātmya and dharmanairātmya).

As we saw above, according to the Sarvāstivādins, all the saṃskāras are of such nature that they perish at every moment: there is nothing which is not subject to this law. Therefore we are unable to think that there exist eternal souls which transmigrate from one world to the other. Can, then, the so-called pudgala (= Ātman) in the world (*i. e.*, laukika-pudgalas) transmigrate? No. They are nothing but the aggregations of the skandhas. The belief that the laukika-pudgalas can transmigrate is derived from the false inference made from the fact that the laukika-pudgalas can continue to exist for a certain period in the life-time.

Not only can no entity souls exist and transmigrate, neither can entity dharmas exist and transmigrate. This can be concluded from the fact that in the nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa there can exist no skandhas which form the laukika-pudgalas. Cf. 'Shu-chi; ˏFa-jên III, p. 22b.

For the views of other schools cf. VII, 3 and p. 55, note 1; IX A, 24; XII, 1.

[2] The four fundamental dhyānas are called by the Sarvāstivādins the lokottara-dhyānas. This is a proposition in opposition to the Mahīśāsakas who entertained the contrary opinion. Cf. IX A, 14.

[3] As Wassiljew pointed out vitarka (尋) and vicāra (伺) are the two technical terms which are often mentioned side by side in the Buddhist literature. Both of them have similar meanings such as reflection, reasoning, investigation, examination etc. They are the technical terms for the two mental states which characterize the first dhyāna (cf. p. 44, note 1).

As to the nature of vitarka or "reasoning" the opinions of the early Ābhidharmikas seem to have been divided. Vasumitra states at least two different opinions in our text. The first of them is that of the Sarvāstivādins which is mentioned in the present proposition and the second that of the Mahīśāsakas (IX A, 15). The former thought that the vitarka can also be of the nature of anāsrava, but the latter thought differently. According to them the vitarka is connected with certain passions.

45. Good (karmas) can also become the cause of existences (bhava).[1]

46. In the state of the samāhita one cannot utter words.[2]

47. (Only) the eight constituents of the āryan path (āryāṣṭaṅga-mārga) form the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism (lit. are the wheel of the righteous law,—samyagdharmacakra): not all the speeches of the Tathāgata can be regarded as the preaching of the righteous law (lit. turning of the wheel of law).[3]

48. The Buddha cannot expound all doctrines (dharma) with a single utterance.[4]

49. The world-honoured one utters (lit. has) also words which are not in conformity with the truth (ayathārtha).[5]

50. The sūtras (or "discourses") delivered by the Buddha are not all perfect in themselves (nītārtha). The Buddha himself said that there were certain imperfect sūtras (anītārtha sūtra).[6]

These are all the original doctrines held in common (by all the members of the Sarvāstivāda school). The later differentiated doctrines are of innumerable kinds.

VI.

THE HAIMAVATA SCHOOL

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Haimavata school:---

1. The Bodhisattvas are still average men (pṛthagjana).[7]

2. The Bodhisattvas are not subject to (lit. do not cause to arise) greed (rāga) and love (kāma) when they enter their (mothers') womb.[8]

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[1] A proposition in opposition to the Mahīśāsakas. The Mahīśāsakas thought that the only cause of transmigration in the three worlds (tribhava),—kāma-dhātu, rūpa-dhātu and arūpa-dhātu—was bad actions, but the Sarvāstivādins maintained that good actions also contribute to transmigration. Cf. IX A, 16.

[2] A proposition in opposition to the Mahāsaṃghikas. Cf. I A, 25 and p. 23, note 2.

[3] The Mahāsaṃghikas regarded all the speeches of the Tathāgata to be important doctrines of Buddhism (cf. I A, 3 and p. 19, note 2), but the Sarvāstivādins recognised only the eight āryan paths as fundamental doctrines. Cf. introductory verse No. 5 and p. 13, note 2.

[4] Cf. I A, 4.

[5] Cf. I A, 5.

[6] Cf. I A, 40 and p. 28, note 2.

[7] The same opinion is held by the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. V, 39, p. 50, note 2.

[8] Ordinary sentient beings are said to have feelings of love and so on towards their parents at the time of entering their mothers' womb. The Sarvāstivādins held the

3. No heretics (tīrthika) can gain the five supernatural powers (ṛddhi).[1]

4. There is also no deva who leads a holy life (brahmacaryāvasthita).[2]

5. a) Arhants can be tempted by others.
   b) (They) have still ignorance.
   c) (they) have also doubt.
   d) (They) gain spiritual perception by the help of others.
   e) The path is attained by utterance.[3]

The other views (of this school) are, in the main, the same as (those of) the Sarvāstivāda school.

VII.

THE VĀTSĪPUTRĪYA SCHOOL.

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Vātsīputrīya school:—

1. The Pudgalas (補特伽羅) are neither the same as the skandhas nor different from the skandhas (非卽蘊離蘊).[4]

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opinion that even the Bodhisattvas cannot be exempted from this general law. But the Haimavatas differed on this point from them and insisted together with the Mahāsaṃghikas (I A, 19) that the minds of the Bodhisattvas are free from all stain: They enter into their mothers' womb with pure ideas and the aim of bringing salvation to suffering sentient beings. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 23b ff.

[1] Cf. p. 42, note 4.

[2] Cf. p. 42, note 5.

[3] Cf. p. 24, note 2.

[4] One of the salient doctrines of Buddhism is the theory of non-ego. But there are several logical difficulties on the way of this theory. If there is no ego at all, how is the theory of transmigration, which is one of the other important doctrines of Buddhism to be accounted for? The Sarvāstivādins and others insisted that citta and caitasika dharmas perish at every moment. If this be the case, what can retain mental experiences? Such question seems to have been the subject of much consideration on the part of the early Buddhist thinkers. According to the Hsüan-chwang's record (V) Gopā Arhant, a contemporary of Devaśarman is said to have insisted on the existence of Ātman. Now Devaśarman is the author of the Abhidharma-vijñānakāya-pāda (cf. Takakusu: Abhidharma literature of the Sarvāstivāda, London 1905), who died a hundred years after Śākyamuni (cf. Eitel). We are unfortunately unable, however, to learn the exact theory of Gopā Arhant, because his work, which is described by Hsüan-chwang, is extant neither in Chinese nor in Tibetan. But he seems to be one of the precursors of the Vātsīputrīyas or Sautrāntikas who recognised a certain kind of ego (XII, 3, p. 67, note 2). The Vātsīputrīyas have, as is well known, postulated the existence of a certain ego in order perhaps to meet the aforementioned difficulties. But their notion of the ego is altogether different

The name (pudgala) is provisionally given to (an aggregation of) the skandhas, āyatanas (and) dhātus.[1]

2. Some saṃskāras exist for some time while others perish at every moment.[2]

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from that of Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and other Brahmanical systems, and also from the "worldly pudgalas" of the Sarvāstivādins (Cf. V, 42). They seem to have divided the earlier and contemporary theories of ātman or pudgala into two classes, namely the theory which insists that pudgalas are identical with the skandhas and the theory which holds that pudgalas are different from the skandhas. And while they negated the existence of the pudgalas which fall under these categories, they established their own category of pudgalas, which they called the pudgala which is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas. What, then, are the attributes of such pudgalas? As to this question they seem to have taken an agnostic view. This can be concluded from their postulation of five kinds of existences, namely the three saṃskṛta-dharmas (Cf. p. 40, note 2), asaṃskṛta-dharmas and unspeakable existences (lit. unspeakable store 不可說藏). The so-called pudgalas of the Vātsīputrīyas belong to the fifth category of existences. We cannot, therefore, ascribe any attributes to them; we have only to believe in their existence.

It is to be remembered here that the Vātsīputrīyas were accused of heresy amongst the Buddhists by the Sarvāstivādins and others, because they recognised the existence of a certain ego. (Cf. Stcherbatsky: The soul theory of the Buddhists, Petersburg, 1918.) But we cannot pass over the fact that this thought contained the first germ of the development of the Ālaya-vijñāna theory of the later Vijñānavādins. Though the vijñāptimātrasiddhi-śāstra (I) tries to refute the Vātsīputrīya view, yet it seems to me that the Yogācāra theory is much indebted to the ideas of the Vātsīputrīyas and also to the similar ideas of the Sautrāntikas. (Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 25a ff.)

[1] "The ego is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas. The same applies to the relation of the ego to the āyatanas and dhātus. But (the man of) the world says that rūpa is the ego . . . . . dharma also the ego. This is the provisional ego established with reference to the skandha and so on. (But) really (the ego) is not the skandhas and so on." Shu-chi.

[2] As we have seen elsewhere the Sarvāstivādins established a theory that all the saṃskāras are subject to perpetual changes. (Cf. V, 41.) According to them the continuation of things means the continuation of destruction and recreation of things which takes place at every moment. Now the present proposition says that some saṃskāras exist for some time while others perish at every moment. According to the Shu-chi the things which continue for some time are the earth, life etc., while the things which perish momentarily are the citta (mind), caitasika (mental states) etc. When we accept this interpretatioo the present proposition conveys the same idea as that of the later Mahāsaṃghikas who insisted that the material constituents of a person were subject to change while the citta and caitasika were not. (I B, 7.) When we take this into consideration, the idea of "changes of things" and that of "perpetual destruction and re-creation" seem to be contrary notions. It may not be out of place here to note the several schools which discussed this problem in our text. The schools which sided with the Sarvāstivāda view are the earlier Mahīśāsaka (IX A, 23) and Kāśyapīya (XI, 4) and the schools which opposed it are the later Mahāsaṃghikas (I B, 7), Vātsīputrīyas (VII, 2) and the later Mahīśāsakas (IX B, 6). Cf. p. 61, note 4.

3. Things (dharma) cannot transmigrate (saṃkrānti) from one world to the other (lit. from the preceding to the later world) apart from the Pudgala. They can be said to transmigrate along with the Pudgala.[1]

4. (Even) heretics (tirthika) can gain the five supernatural powers (ṛddhi).[2]

5. The five consciousnesses (pañcavijñāna) neither (conduce to) passion (sarāga) nor to freedom from passion (virāga).[3]

6. (Man) is called virāga (離欲 or "free from desire") when he has relinquished the bonds (saṃyojana) in the world of desire which are to be destroyed in the bhāvanā-(mārga) (bhāvanā-prahātavya) and not (when he has relinquished the saṃyojanas which are) to be destroyed in the darśana-(mārga) (darśana-prahātavya).[4]

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1 The interpretation of this proposition, given in the Shu-chi is as follows: . . . . "The things, (five skandhas and so on) do not transmigrate (apart from the pudgala). It must be said that when life (jīva) comes to an end, the things (which constitute the body) also accordingly perish. But ātman (*i. e.*, pudgala of the Vātsīputrīyas) does not perish: therefore it can transmigrate from the earlier world to the later world. Things cannot be said to transmigrate apart from ātman."

For the opinion of other schools on this point cf. V, 42 and p. 51, note 2; IX A, 24; XII, 1.

2 Cf. p. 42, note 4.

3 Cf. I A, 22 and p. 22, note 1; V, 26; IX A, 10.

4 According to the Fa-jên the point of controversy which resulted in this proposition is said to be the question: if the so-called "six practice-meditation" (六行觀) is able to destroy the five classes of passions or not. Herein the five classes of passions are the four classes of passions which are to be destroyed in the darśana-mārga and a class of passions which is to be removed in the bhāvanā-mārga. The Sarvāstivādins were of opinion that the sixfold meditations will be able to destroy all the five classes of passions, while the Vātsīputrīyas thought that they can destroy only the second group of passions.

The early Ābhidharmikas have divided the passions into two classes, namely the passions to be destroyed in the darśana-mārga and the passions to be removed in the bhāvanā-mārga. The former arise from the delusion concerned with the so-called "matters" or the objects of senses, whereas the latter spring from the ignorance of the four āryan truths. The passions wich fall under these two categories were believed to exist in all the three worlds. Now, as we saw elsewhere (cf. p. 43, note 1), the three worlds are subdivided into a number of sub-stages. The world of desire is divided into five and each of the upper two worlds into four. A Buddhist who is desirous of realizing the Arhantship must destroy the passions of the above two categories, existing in all these sub-stages. How, then, is he able to destroy the passions in them? One of the ways of overcoming them is the practice of the "six practice-meditation" mentioned above. This practice consists in the comparative meditation of the stages.

7. The kṣānti, nāma, lakṣaṇa and laukikāgradharma (or "forbearance, name, characteristic and the highest worldly law") are called (the four preparatory stages for) entrance into the samyaktvanyāma.[1]

8. When (one has) already entered the samyaktvanyāma (one is) called a "repairer" (pratipannaka) during (the stay) in the first twelve stages (lit. minds) (of the darśana-mārga) and (when one enters) the thirteenth stage (lit. mind) one is an "abider-in-the-fruit" (phalāvasthāna).[2]

A lower stage is to be meditated upon as "rough" (麤), (full of) suffering (苦) and (full of) hindrances (障), while a higher stage as "calm (靜), subtle (妙) and free (離)".

It is to be noted here that in the case of this meditation the five sub-stages of the world of desire are treated as one which is known under the name of kṣipta-bhūmi or "the stage of distracted mind." Thus the three worlds (三 界) are divided into nine sub-stages. (九 地). A Buddhist is required to destroy the passions existing in all these nine sub-stages step by step by comparative meditation and to free himself from attachment to the worlds.

As I have observed above the so-called sixfold meditation is the comparative meditation of lower and higher stages. As such it is confined to the meditation on the phenomenal aspects of the stages and not the meditation on the four āryan truths. It is perhaps on this ground that the Vātsīputrīyas contended that the sixfold meditation cannot destroy the passions which arise from the ignorance of the truth. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 28a.

[1] The sub-stages of the second course of the preliminary sanctification were called by the Sarvāstivādins 1. uṣmagata, 2. mūrdhāna, 3. kṣānti and 4. laukikāgradharma, or "heat, head, forbearance and the highest worldly law." (Cf. p. 25, note 3.) It is interesting to note here that the Vātsīputrīyas have given different names to them and styled them respectively 1. kṣānti, 2. nāma, 3. lakṣaṇa and 4. laukikāgradharma. According to the Shu-chi, the first of the sub-stages derives its name from the acceptance (lit. forbearance, —kṣānti) of the four āryan truths, the second and the third from the enquiries into the meanings and the metaphysical grounds of the four āryan truths. The fourth has the same name as that of the Sarvāstivādins and signifies the stage of the cousummation of the philosophical enquiry. The Vātsīputrīyas considered these four sub-stages to be those which lead directly to the samyaktva-nyāma. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 28b.

[2] A view which differs from that of the Sarvāstivādins (V, 6). According to the Sarvāstivādins a Buddhist who has completed the course of the preliminary sanctification is required to meditate again upon each of the four āryan truths four times, twice with reference to the world of desire and twice with reference to the two higher worlds (namely rūpa- and arūpa-dhātus). But according to the Vātsīputrīyas he is to exercise the meditation only once with reference to the two higher worlds, though he has to meditate twice with reference to the world of desire. In other words, a Buddhist has to exercise the meditation on each of the four āryan truths three times. Thus the total number of meditations on the four āryan truths becomes, in the case of the Vātsīputrīyas, in all thirteen and not sixteen as in the case of the Sarvāstivādins. The Vātsīputrīyas regard the period of the first twelve exercises as that of "repairing", during which a Buddhist proceeds towards the destination of a certain rank of saintship. According to them a Buddhist attains a certain rank by the thirteenth exercise of meditation (Cf. p. 41, note 1).

These are the differentiated doctrines (of the Vātsīputriya school).[1]

VIII.

THE DHARMOTTARĪYA, BHADRĀYANĪYA, SAMMATĪYA AND CHANNAGIRIKA SCHOOLS

On account of the differences of opinion as to the interpretation of a śloka this school (Vātsīputrīya) split into four: the Dharmottariya, Bhadrāyaṇiya, Sammatiya and Channagirika. The śloka in question:—

Already emancipated, falls away again,
Thro' avarice falls, returns once again,
Attains the place of bliss and enjoys,
According to desire reaches beatitude supreme.[2]

As we saw in the Sarvāstivāda doctrines the Vātsīputrīyas also are said to have allowed a Buddhist saint to pass over certain lower ranks. One who has destroyed the six kinds of passions before entering the samyaktvanyāma can rise immediately to the second rank, *i. e.*, he becomes at once Sakṛdāgāmin, whereas one who has destroyed the nine kinds of passions can attain directly to the third rank; *i. e.*, Anāgāmin. Cf. p. 46, note 2; ˛Fa-jên III, p. 29a ff.

The Vātsīputrīyas differed from the Sarvāstivādins as to the number of exercises of meditation; they differed also in naming the results of meditation. When a Buddhist meditates upon suffering in the world of desire and gets certain insight into the truth of suffering he acquires a knowledge which is called duḥkhe dharmajñāna. No perfect insight of the truth can, however, be acquired by a single meditation. A Buddhist is required to meditate again upon the same truth which results in the acquisition of duḥkhe dharmakṣānti. The man who has acquired the two aforementioned kinds of knowledge is now to proceed to meditation on the suffering in the rūpa- and arūpa-dhātus. This meditation brings him the knowledge which is called duḥkhe 'nvayajñāna. As we saw in p. 41, note 1 the Sarvāstivādins called the results of meditation on the suffering in the world of desire and in the two higher worlds 1. duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti, 2. duḥkhe dharmajñāna, 3. duḥkhe 'nvayajñānakṣānti and 4. duḥkhe 'nvayajñāna. When we compare the above three names of the Vātsīputrīyas with those mentioned above, we find a great analogy between them. The only differences are that the third kind of knowledge in the list of the Sarvāstivādins is wanting in the Vātsīputrīyas and the first and second in the Sarvāstivāda list are in the contrary order in the Vātsīputrīyas. These differences may be observed in the names of kinds of knowledge which come into being as the result of meditation on the other three truths. Cf. p. 41, note 1.

The above three names of different kinds of knowledge are those which were taken from the commentary ˊShu-ch'i. There are, however, certain authorities which differ from the ˊShu-ch'i as to the naming of these kinds of knowledge. Cf. ˛Fa-jên III, p. 29a.

[1] Lit. There are so many different meanings.

[2] 已解脫更墮 墮由貪復還
獲安喜所樂 隨樂行至樂

IX.

THE MAHĪŚĀSAKA SCHOOL

A. The original doctrines which were held in common

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Mahīśāsaka school are:—

The differences of interpretation of the above verse are described in our text to be the origin of the four schools. Unfortunately, however, our text is silent as to the different interpretations. The only source from which we can know them seems to be the tradition which is handed down from Paramārtha and which is set forth in the ˢShu-chi.

According to this authority the Dharmottarīyas are said to have enumerated the three kinds of Arhants, viz.:

1. the Arhants who are subject to retrogression (退),
2. the Arhants who stand still (住), and
3. the Arhants who proceed forward. (進).

The Dharmottarīyas have interpreted the first two lines to mean the first class of Arhants who through avarice are subject to retrogression after once acquiring emancipation. The Arhants who have so retrogressed can, however, very soon return to Arhantship. The third line, according to them, refers to the second class of Arhants, the fourth to the third group of Arhants.

The Bhadrāyaṇīyas are described by the above authority to have thought that the present verse is the interpretation of the Śrāvaka, Pratyeka and Buddha. According to them the first two lines refer to the Śrāvaka, the third and fourth to the Pratyeka and Buddha.

The Sammatīyas have taken the present proposition to be one which explains the six sorts of men:—

1. Srotaāpanna, 2. Sakṛdāgāmipratipannaka, 3. Sakṛdāgāmin, 4. a man who is hindered by only one kind of passion, *i. e.*, avarice (一間人), 5. Anāgāmin, 6. Arhant.

The phrase "already emancipated" means a Srotaāpanna, "falls away again" and "returns once again" a Sakṛdāgāmipratipannaka and Anāgāmin. A Sakṛdāgāminpratipannaka is believed to be born often amongst devas and men: hence "falls away again." But a Sakṛdāgāmin can enter into nirvāṇa only by going out of this world and coming back again: hence the phrase "returns once again." "Thro' avarice falls" is, according to the Sammatīyas, the explanation of the fourth group of men in the above list. The third and fourth lines are interpreted to mean an Anāgāmin and Arhant.

Now we are in a position to see the interpretation of the Channagirikas. The first phrase is, according to them, the explanation of an Arhant who thinks of (思) committing suicide through fear of falling away from the path which he has acquired. The second phrase "falls away again" refers to an Arhant who falls (退). The phrase "thro' avarice falls" is said to mean an Arhant who must be a strict observer of the law (護), otherwise he is bound to retrogress, whereas the phrase "returns once again" an Arhant who remains steady (住). The third line applies to an Arhant who has excellent capacity for knowledge (堪達) through which he attains the place of bliss and enjoys it, while the last verse an Arhant who gets inflexibility (不動) of mind and can enter nirvāṇa as he wishes. Cf. ˢShu-chi; ˏFa-jên III, p. 29b ff.

1. The past and the future do not exist, (whereas) the present and the asaṃskāras do exist.[1]

2. The four āryan truths are to be meditated upon at one and the same time. When anyone has seen the truth of suffering (duḥkha-satya) he can realize the (remaining three) truths. Any one who has already realized (the four āryan truths at one and the same time in one stage) can always see them in like manner (in another).[2]

3. The anuśaya (or "dormant passion") is neither citta (mind) nor caitasika (mental state): it never becomes the object of thought (anālambana).[3]

4. (The anuśaya is) different from the paryavasthāna (or "pervading passion"). The substance (svabhāva) of the anuśaya does not combine with the mind (citta-visamprayukta) (whereas) that of the paryavasthāna does (citta-samprayukta).[4]

5. An average man (pṛthagjana) cannot destroy greed (rāga) and anger (pratigha) in (the world of) desire (kāma-dhātu).[5]

6. No heretic (tirthika) can gain the five supernatural powers (ṛddhi).[6]

7. There is no deva who leads a holy life (brahmacaryāvasthita).[7]

8. It is certain that there is no intermediate state of existence (antarābhava).[8]

9. Arhants do not perform (lit. have not) meritorious deeds which may lead to worldly happiness (puṇyakriyā virūḍha).[9]

10. The five consciousnesses (pañcavijñāna) conduce both to passion (sarāga) and to freedom from passion (virāga).[10]

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1 Cf. I A, 45 and p. 31, note 1; V, 1 and p. 39, note 1; IX B, 1.

2 Cf. I A, 21 and p. 21, note 4; V, 5.

3 The same view as that of the Mahāsaṃghikas, but in opposition to that of the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. I A, 43 and p. 30, note 2; V, 20.

4 The same view as that of the Mahāsaṃghikas, but different from that of the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. I A, 44 and p. 30, note 3; V, 21.

5 A contrary opinion to that of the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. V, 10 and p. 42, note 3.

6 Cf. p. 42, note 4.

7 Cf. p. 42, note 5.

8 Cf. p. 31, note 3.

9 A proposition in opposition to the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. V, 24.

10 The same view as the Mahāsaṃghikas but different from the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas. Cf. I A, 22 and p. 22, note 1; V, 26; VII, 5.

11. The six consciousnesses (vijñāna) all combine with vitarka and vicāra.[1]

12. There are also "topmost pudgalas" (齊首補特伽羅).[2]

13. There is worldly right view (laukikasamyagdṛṣṭi). There is no worldly power of faith (laukikaśraddhendriya).[3]

14. There are no transcendental abstract meditations (lokottaradhyāna).[4]

15. There is also no vitarka which is not connected with human passion.[5]

16. Good (karmas) cannot become the cause of existences (bhāva).[6]

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1 As we saw elsewhere, vitarka and vicāra are the two mental phases which characterize the mental state of a man who is in the first dhyāna. (Cf. p. 42, note 1). The six consciousnesses in the present proposition are the five senses and the mind. Now the present proposition says that the six consciousnesses combine with vitarka and vicāra. That is to say, the above two mental phases, reasoning and investigation, can be found, not only in the active state of mind, but even in the sense perception. The Ābhidharmikas who opposed this strange view are said to be the Sautrāntikas, according to whose opinion they can be observed only in the function of the mind. It is said, however, that the Sarvāstivādins were of the same opinion as the Mahīśāsakas. Cf. Fa-jên III, p. 33 a; IX B, 5 and p. 60, note 9.

2 One of the ambiguous sentences in Vasumitra's treatise. Wassiljew has translated the Tibetan version as follows: „Der Pudgala ist gleich dem Haupt," *i. e.*, "the pudgala is equal to the head." But this translation is very doubtful. If we admit that this translation is right then the first question to be raised will be the meaning of pudgala. In the case of this translation it seems adequate to take it in the sense of ātman. But we cannot think that the Mahīśāsakas believed in the existence of entity pudgala, because they did not admit the transmission of any thing from one world to the other. Cf. IX A, 24.

The Chinese characters which I have translated here as "topmost" are ch'i-shou (齊首), *i. e.*, "equal head." But this term is interpreted in the Fa-jên in the sense of "topmost," the character ch'i being interpreted in the same sense as chi (際). Now let us turn to the commentary Shu-chi. According to this authority the topmost pudgala means an Anāgāmin who is born in the highest stage of the 25 existences (有頂地 Bhavāgrabhūmi). He does not attain to Arhantship in his life-time, but only after his death when the passions have burnt themselves out. Cf. Shu-chi; Fa-jên III, p. 33b.

3 The Mahāsaṃghikas negated both laukikasamyagdṛṣṭi and laukikaśraddhendriya, while the Sarvāstivādins admitted the existence of both. (Cf. I A, 36 and p. 27, note 1; V, 30). The Mahīśāsakas admitted the existence of the first while they negated the second. But one thing to be observed here is that though in the T'ang-lun from which the present translation is made, the Mahīśāsakas are described to have recognised the existence of the first, yet both Ch'en-lun and Ch'in-lun describe them as having negated it. The Tibetan version agrees with the T'ang-lun. Cf. Wassiljew, p. 281.

4 Cf. V, 43. Fa-jên III, p. 34.

5 Cf. V, 44 and p. 49, note 4. Fa-jên III, p. 35a.

6 Cf. V, 45 and p. 50, note 1.

17. Srotaāpannas are subject to retrogression, (whereas) Arhants are certainly not subject to retrogression.[1]

18. The (eight) constituents (of the āryan) path (mārgaṅga) belong to (the category of) the smṛtyupasthāna.[2]

19. The asaṃskṛta-dharmas are of nine kinds, namely:—

a) Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.
b) Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.
c) Akaśa.
d) Acala or "Immovability."[3]
e) Kuśala-dharma-tathatā or "Eternal law of good dharma."
f) Akuśala-dharma-tathatā or "Eternal law of bad dharma."
g) Avyakṛta-dharma-tathatā or "Eternal law of indeterminate dharma."
h) Mārgāṅga-tathatā or "Eternal law of the path."
i) Pratītya-samutpāda-tathatā or "Eternal law of causation."

20. Entrance into the womb is the beginning and death is the end (of human life). (During this life) the material constituents (mahābhūta) of the sense-organs are subject to change (lit. the great seeds of the rūpendriyas have all change): the citta and caitasika-dharmas are also subject to change (lit. have also change).[4]

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1 The same view as is held by the Mahāsaṃghikas, but contrary to that held by the Sarvāstivādins; cf. I A, 35 and p. 26, note 1; V, 8. The four schools, namely Dharmottarīya, Bhadrāyaṇīya, Sammatīya and Channagirika have also treated the same subject. Cf. p. 57, note 2.

2 Cf. V, 19 and p. 46, note 3.

3 Ch'en-lun: anātman or non-ego.

It is interesting to notice that both the Mahāsaṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas enumerated the same number of asaṃskṛtadharmas, which, with four exceptions, had similar names. Cf. I A, 41 and p. 28, note 3.

4 A view which differs much from the later Mahāsaṃghikas. (Cf. I B, 7.) The later Mahāsaṃghikas thought that the citta and caitasikas, unlike the material constituents of sense organs, were not subject to change: they are the things which are subject to perpetual destruction and re-creation. Now this proposition tells us that both the material constituents and the citta and caitasikadharmas are subject to change.

One thing which puzzles us here is that the present proposition is not consistent with the other propositions of the Mahīśāsakas. We find later in our text the so-called momentary destruction theory of all the saṃskāras. (Cf. IX A, 23.) As I have already observed the notion of change of things and the notion of perpetual destruction and re-creation are in opposition to each other. (Cf. p. 54, note 2.) How can these contradictory opinions in one and the same text be accounted for? The Shu-chi tries to solve this question by saying that the Mahīśāsakas excepted the material and mental constituents of an individual from the saṃskāras. It seems to me, however, that this interpretation does

21. The saṃgha includes the Buddha (lit. there is the Buddha in the saṃgha). Therefore one who gives alms to the saṃgha acquires a great merit (lit. fruit); but not (so when one gives alms) separately to the Buddha.[1]

22. The Buddha and the two vehicles (yāna) have one and the same path (mārga) and one and the same emancipation (vimukti).[2]

23. All the saṃskāras perish at every moment.[3]

24. It is certain that there is nothing which can transmigrate from one world to the other (lit. from the former world to the later).[4]

These are the original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of this (school).

B. The later differentiated doctrines.

The later differentiated doctrines (of the Mahīśāsakas):—

1. (They) maintain that the past and the future really exist.[5]
2. There is also an intermediate state of existence (antarābhava).[6]
3. All the dharmāyatanas can be known and can also be understood.[7]
4. Will (cetanā 思) is the source of actions (karma) (lit. actions are indeed will). There are no actions either by word or deed (lit. body) (which come into being without the sanction of the will).[8]
5. Vitarka and vicāra can combine with (one another).[9]

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not sound plausible enough. In any case the reading of this proposition is the same in all the translations, Chinese and Tibetan. (The ˢShu-chi offers another interpretation besides that mentioned above. But this seems to me more far-fetched than the first. Cf. ˢShu-chi; ˌFa-jêu III, p. 37 a).

[1] It is interesting to notice that the Mahīśāsakas gave more importance to the saṃgha than to the historical Buddha. The Dharmaguptika school held the contrary view. (Cf. X, 1.)

[2] A proposition in opposition to the Sarvāstivādins and Dharmaguptikas. Cf. V, 37; and p. 47, note 8; X, 3.

[3] Cf. p. 52, note 2 & p. 59, note 4.

[4] Cf. V, 42 and p. 49, note 2; VII, 3; XII, 1.

[5] The same view as that of the Sarvāstivādins (V, 2), but different from that of the Mahāsaṃghikas (I A, 45) and the earlier Mahīśāsaskas (IX, A, 1).

[6] Cf. I A, 47 and p. 29, note 3; V, 25; IX, A, 8.

[7] The same view as that of the Sarvāstivādins (V, 2) but different from that of the Mahāsaṃghikas (I A, 46).

[8] According to the ˌFa-jên this proposition is said to mean that all actions whether in thought, word or deed have cetanā as their "substance." The same authority says further that one of the other schools regard anger (rāga) and heresies as the "substances of actions." Cf. ˌFa-jên III, p. 39a.

[9] According to the ˌFa-jên "this (proposition) is to explain that the two mental phases (lit. things,—dharma), vitarka and vicāra, can arise simultaneously." (Cf. ˌFa-jên

6. The great earth (mahabhūmi) lasts for kalpas (aeons).[1]

7. Even when one makes offerings to a stūpa, the fruit which he acquires (by this) is little.[2]

8. The anuśaya (lit. the svabhāva of—) is always present.[3]

9. The skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus are also always present.[4]

10. There is a later doctrine in this school (which was handed down in a form of a śloka), as to the interpretation of which there arose differences of opinion. The śloka in question:—

> Five are the things that bind.
> From them spring sufferings all;
> Ignorance, covetousness, love (they are);
> (Of) five views and actions (consist the rest).[5]

III, p. 39a). The same authority mentions in another place (III, p. 33a) that the Sarvāstivādins held the same view as this, but the Sautrāntikas and the earlier Mahīśāsakas contradicted this. As to the meanings of these two technical terms cf. p. 49, n. 4;—p. 58, n. 1.

1 Cf. p. 52, note 2.

2 The same view as that of the Caityaśaila, Aparaśaila and Uttaraśaila (IV, 2), but contrary to that of the Dharmaguptika school (X, 2). Cf. p. 62, oote 2.

3 The earlier Mahīśāsakas maintained, together with the Mahāsaṃghikas, that the anuśayas do not combine with the mind. (Cf. I A, 44; IX A, 3.) Now the later Mahīśāsakas went a step further and said that the anuśayas are always present without being controlled by the mind.

For the view of the Sarvāstivādins cf. V, 20.

4 Deest in the Tibetan version.

According to the [1]Shu-chi the constant existence of the skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus is said to have been postulated of the "bījas (種子 or seeds)" and not of the current (samudācāra) skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus. This is undoubtedly an ingenuous interpretation, because otherwise the present proposition contradicts one of the other doctrines of the Mahīśāsakas, namely the doctrine of the perpetual destruction and re-creation of the saṃskāras (XI A, 23). This interpretation is subject, however, to a serious doubt. As it is well-known the bīja theory, *i. e.*, the theory of the causation of the phenomena out of the bījas, plays an important role in the later Yogācāra literature, such as the Vijñāptimātrasiddhi-śāstra etc. I am unable, at present, to ascertain if the Mahīśāsaka Ābhidharmikas had already the bīja theory in mind.

5 五法定能縛 諸苦從此生
謂無明貪愛 五見及諸業

We know from the present proposition, which is set forth in a metrical form with a preliminary remark, that the later Mahīśāsakas held an opiuion that the five things (dharma)—ignorance (avidyā), covetousness (rāga), love (kāma), five views (dṛṣṭi) and actions (karma)—are the causes which bind the sentient beings to saṃsāra and the sources from which sufferings arise. Vasumitra tells us now that the opinions of the later Mahīśāsakas were divided as to the interpretation of a verse in which this view is set forth: but he is silent about the differentiated opinions.

X.

THE DHARMAGUPTIKA SCHOOL

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Dharmaguptika school are:—

1. Though the Buddha is included in the saṃgha, yet the merit (lit. fruit) of giving alms separately to the Buddha is great; but not (so great as the merit of giving alms) to the saṃgha.[1]

2. One who makes offerings to a stūpa can acquire great merit (lit. fruit).[2]

3. Though the Buddha and the two vehicles (yāna) are one as to emancipation (vimukti), yet (they are different) as to the āryan path (mārga).[3]

4. No heretics (tīrthika) can gain the five supernatural powers (ṛddhi).[4]

According to the 'Shu-chi the differences are twofold. One group of the Mahīśāsakas interpreted the five things to be the most powerful passions (kleśa). The five views (dṛṣṭi)—satkāya-dṛṣṭi, antaparigrāha-dṛṣṭi, mithyā-dṛṣṭi, dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa-dṛṣṭi and śīla-vrata-parāmarśa-dṛṣṭi,—are the most potent kleśas which are to be destroyed in the darśana-mārga while covetousness (rāga) and love (kāma) are the most powerful kleśas which are to be destroyed in the bhāvanā-mārga. Ignorance (avidyā) is found potent in both paths; actions (karma) are the direct cause of transmigration. We know from proposition IX A, 16 that the Mahīśāsakas insisted that good actions do not bring about transmigration. Therefore "actions" here means "bad actions."

The other group of the later Mahīśāsakas is said to have understood the five things to represent some of the twelve nidānas. The following is the table of the representation:—

The five dharmas	The twelve nidānas
1. ignorance (avidyā)	ignorance (avidyā).
2. covetousness (rāga) 3. love (kāma) . . .	desire (tṛṣṇā).
4. five views (pañca dṛṣṭi)	attachment (upādāna).
5. actions (karma)	actions (saṃskāra). becoming (bhava).

Cf. 'Shu-chi; 'Fa-jên III, p. 40f.

1 A contrary view to that of the Mahīśāsakas. Cf. IX A, 21 & p. 62, note 1.

2 The relic worship, especially stūpa worship, played an important role in Buddhism long before the Christian era. This can be evidenced by the archaeological survey made in India. It is not without interest to notice the controversy on this point amongst early Ābhidharmikas. The present proposition is in opposition to the Caityaśaila, Aparaśaila, Uttaraśaila and the later Mahīśāsakas. (Cf. IV, 2; IX B, 7.)

3 The same view as that held by the Sarvāstivādins, but different from that of the Mahīśāsakas. (Cf. V, 37 & p. 49, note 8; IX A, 22.)

4 Cf. p. 42, note 4.

5. The body of an Arhant is free from passion (anāsrava).[1]

The remaining doctrines (of this school) are mostly the same as the views of the Mahāsaṃghika school.

XI.

THE KĀŚYAPĪYA SCHOOL

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Kāśyapiya school[2] are:—

1. If the passions (kleśa) (lit. dharma) were already destroyed and if it were already fully known (by an Arhant that they have been annihilated) then they would cease to exist in him (lit. there is none): (but in case they were) not destroyed and (this was) not fully known (then their substances would continue to) exist.[3]

2. If the fruits of actions (karmaphala) have already ripened, then they cease to exist: (but if these fruits) have not ripened they (continue to) exist.[4]

3. The saṃskāras come into being through causes in the past but not through causes in the future (lit. the saṃskāras derive their causes from the past: they do not derive their causes from the future).[5]

4. All the saṃskāras perish at every moment.[6]

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[1] According to the 'Shu-chi the physical elements which constitute an Arhant are not the source of passions either to himself or to others. Therefore the body of an Arhant is anāsrava, *i. e.*, free from passion. Cf. I A, 2.

[2] The Ch'en-lun: Suvarṣaka.

[3] According to the 'Shu-chi this proposition is said to mean that when "passions have been destroyed in the anantara-(mārga) and it is known in the vimukti-(mārga) that they are entirely destroyed" the substances of passions cease to exist, when the passions were not destroyed and it was not known that they were destroyed then the substances of the passions continue to exist. The same authority says that this is a proposition in opposition to the Sarvāstivādins who maintain that the substances of passions exist even when the passions have been destroyed. Cf. 'Fa-jên III, p. 43b.

[4] According to the karma theory karmas are bound to bring their fruits or retribution in this world or in the future. So long as they have not reached their fruition, they continue to exist till their full development. Cf. 'Fa-jên III, p. 44.

[5] This is said to be a proposition in opposition to the Sarvāstivādins who held the opinion that the future also can become the passive cause which does not, however, hinder the working of the causes from the past.

[6] Cf. p. 54, note 2 & p. 61, note 4.

5. The śaikṣa-dharmas are (still) accompanied by (lit. have) the vipākaphalas.[1]

The remaining doctrines (of this school) are mostly the same as the views of the Dharmaguptika school.

XII.

THE SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

The original doctrines held in common (by all the members) of the Sautrāntika school:—[2]

1. The skandhas transmigrate from one world to the other (lit. from the former world to the later): hence the name "Saṅkrāntivāda" (or "the school which maintains the transference of the skandhas").[3]

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[1] The Chinese which I have restored here as the śaikṣa-dharma is 有學法 yu-hsiao-fa. Both the commentaries, 'Shu-chi and Fa-jên, are silent as to the exact meaning of this technical term. If my restoration be accepted it must refer to the sekhiya-dhammas in the Pāli literature. Sekhiya-dhammas are the seventy precepts, "regulating the conduct of the priests and applying to their mode of dress, deportment, eating and so on." (Childers).

The present proposition is too succinct to be properly comprehended. This proposition, however, seems to refer to the priestly regulations which are to be observed by the first seven śaikṣā 'rya-pudgalas. The question which gave rise to this proposition seems to be: can the observance of the śaikṣa-dharmas or the actions of śaikṣas still bring their vipākaphalas or not? Now śaikṣa-dharmas are supposed, according to the general notion, to be anāsrava-dharmas. Accordingly they are supposed not to bring the fruits of retribution and they cannot become the cause of transmigration. But it must be remembered here that the first seven ārya-pudgalas have still human passions to eradicate, the first of them having a maximum and the last a minimum. Therefore they must also obtain some fruits in proportion to their passions. It seems to me that such fruits have been called here vipākaphala. The 'Shu-chi offers two sets of interpretations, but neither of them appears to me very satisfactory. Cf. 'Shu-chi; Fa-jên III, p. 45 a f.

[2] The Ch'en-lun: Saṅkrāntivāda (說度部); Ch'in-lun: Santānavāda (相續部).

[3] A proposition which explains the origin of another name of the Sautrāntika school.

As we have already seen the Vātsīputrīyas postulated the existence of a certain ego (pudgala) and held a view that things can transmigrate from one world to the other along with the pudgala. (Cf. VII, 3.) But this view was refuted by the Sarvāstivādins and the earlier Mahīśāsakas on the ground of their so-called momentary destruction theory. (Cf. V, 42 and IX A, 24.) Now the present proposition says that the skandhas can transmigrate from one world to the other. Then, what are meant by the skandhas

2. Apart from the āryan paths there is no eternal destruction of the skandhas.[1]

here? The interpretation in the 'Shu-chi is far from being clear. It interprets this with an ambiguous phrase "real-dharma-ātman." (Cf. 'Shu-chi; Fa-jên III, 46 b.) Does this signify the entity ego (ātman of real dharmas) or does it mean the real dharma and real ātman? One thing which is to be remembered in this connection is that the same authority has interpreted it in another place as bījas. (Cf. 'Shu-chi; Fa-jên II, p. 9b.) What is meant by the word bījas here? Is it a synonym of the "real-dharma-ātman?" We know from proposition 3 that the Sautrāntikas postulated two kinds of skandhas. In what relation do the skandhas in the present proposition stand to those in proposition 3? It is to be regretted that the 'Shu-chi is altogether silent on these questions. It seems to me that the skandhas in this proposition are the same as the ekarasaskandhas in proposition 3. For the meaning of the ekarasaskandhas cf. p. 68, note 1.

According to the present proposition the Sautrāntikas are said to have received another name "Saṅkrāntivādins" because they insisted on the theory of transference of the skandhas from one world to the other.

Besides the name "Saṅkrāntivāda" the Sautrāntika school had another name, namely, the "Dārṣṭāntika." Professor de la Vallée Poussin took Dārṣṭāntika to be the name of a branch of the Sautrāntika school. (Cf. E. R. E. Art. Santrāntika.) But so far as the Chinese sources are concerned the Dārṣṭāntikas seem to have preceded the Sautrāntikas. K'wei-chi, the commentator of the Vijñāptimātrasiddhi-śāstra says in his 'Shu-chi (II & IV) (S. E. K. E. LXXVII 1, p. 49 & 2, p. 142b), that the original teacher of the Sautrāntika school was called Kumāralabdha. He appeared a hundred years after the death of the Buddha and was the author of the Dṛṣṭāntamālā-śāstra (喻鬘論) or "the treatise (called) the garland of similes." Because he explained the Buddhist doctrines with similes he and his followers were called the philosophers who dealt with similes *i. e.*, Dārṣṭāntikas. The next well-known exponent of this school is Śrīlabdha who was born four hundred years after the Buddha. He was the author of the Vibhāṣā of the Sautrāntikas. But at his time there existed no name of Sautrāntika as yet. It was only after his death that the name Sautrāntika came into being.—It goes without saying that we must be very careful in accepting such a tradition as this. But it seems probable that the Dārṣṭāntikas preceded the Sautrāntikas. As may be judged from the very name the Sautrāntikas were a group of thinkers who protested against the Ābhidharmikas on the ground that they attached too much importance to the abhidharma works and started a revival movement of regarding the sūtras as the only authority. We must assume, therefore, that they appeared at the time when the aforementioned Ābhidharmikas began to possess much influence over other schools.

[1] Nirvāṇa signifies in the original Buddhism the annihilation of the individual who is the aggregation of the skandhas. The aggregation of skandhas is due to the passions (kleśa). Therefore to realize nirvāṇa man must destroy the passions. But how is such destruction possible? The Sautrāntikas thought that the observance of the eightfold paths is the only way. A man may be able to suppress the passions by the sixfold meditations (cf. p. 55, note 4), yet he cannot by this means eradicate them. According to the Fa-jên (III, p. 46b) this proposition is in opposition to the view of the Sarvāstivādins (V, 10).

3. There are the mūlāntikaskandhas (根邊蘊) and also the ekarasaskandhas (一味蘊).[1]

4. An average man (pṛthagjana) also possesses the potentiality of becoming a Buddha (lit. in the state of an average man there are also divine things, āryadharma).[2]

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[1] One of the most interesting propositions from the historical point of view. As such it may be advisable to give the translation of the important passages in the Shu-chi before giving my opinions. It says:—

"....... The ekarasaskandha (or the skandha of one taste) continues to exist (lit. turns) from time immemorial without changing its nature (lit. in one taste): it is the "subtle consciousness" (細意識) which is unintermittent and which possesses the four skandhas...... The mūla (or original) (of the mūlāntikaskandha) means the aforementioned subtle consciousness. (This) is the origin (of a sentient being who) transmigrates (lit. abides) in the saṃsāra. Therefore it is called mūla. From this origin there arise the five skandhas, which are also spoken of by (other) schools. Now the ekarasaskandha, being the origin, is not called antika (or end). The other five skandhas which are intermittent spring out of this origin: hence the name mūlāntikaskandha."

One thing which is to be recollected here is that our authority has employed the term "subtle consciousness," the synonym of the ekarasaskandha in the above quotation, in interpreting a proposition of the Mahāsaṃghikas (cf. I B, 8 and p. 34, note 3). Is there any doctrinal relation between the Mahāsaṃghikas and Sautrāntikas? The Mahāyānasamparigraha-śāstra, a work of Asaṅga, seems to give a positive answer to this question. We find in it the following sentence:—"In the Āgama of the Mahāsaṃghika also this (Ālaya-consciousness) is esoterically spoken of. It is called there the 'original consciousness' (mūlavijñāna)." (T. E. XVIII, 9, p. 31 a.) When we take this passage into consideration we cannot but perceive that the idea of Ālaya-vijñāna is derived from the Mahāsaṃghika thought. But we have several reasons to believe that the Mahāsaṃghikas preceded the Sautrāntikas whose thoughts have influenced the founders of the Yogācāra school. It seems to me that the Sautrāntika idea of the ekarasaskandha of the subtle consciousness which becomes the substance of transmigration (XII, 1) and from which the current five skandhas come into existence was derived originally from the Mahāsaṃghika thought.

As to the doctrinal relation between the Sautrāntikas and the Vijñānavādins we are not required to give it much of our consideration. When we examine the Ālaya-consciousness theory as it is set forth in the Vijñaptimātrasiddhi-śāstra and Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra and compare it with the ideas of the Sautrāntikas we find a striking analogy between the thoughts of the two schools. Further evidence for this may be found in the historical fact that Vasubandhu, one of the founders of the Yogācāra-philosophy, was a student of the Sautrāntika school also before his conversion to the Mahāyāna faith. (Cf. Life of Vasubandhu. Tr. by Takakusu. "T'oung pao," 1904.)

[2] Deest in the Tibetan version, and also in the Ch'in-lun. Wassiljew has translated this proposition as „auch für den einfachen Sterblichen kann Annahme des heiligen Gesetzes stattfinden," (even for the average man there is the possibility of accepting the divine law). (Wassiljew, p. 284, note 5.) This translation is, however, not only inaccurate, it does not even tally with the interpretation in the Shu-chi. According to the aforementioned authority, this proposition signifies that ordinary people also have the

5. There are the Paramārthapudgalas.[1]

The remaining views are mostly the same as (those of) the Sarvāstivāda school.

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anāsrava-bījas (*i. e.*, the potential elements of becoming a Buddha) a priori. Evidently the commentator has understood the ārya-dharmas in this proposition in the sense of anāsrava-bījas. If this interpretation can be accepted, we must admit that the Mahāyāna-idea that all sentient beings can become Buddha has already existed amongst the thinkers of the Sautrāntika-school.

[1] We are already acquainted with the idea of laukikātman of the Sarvāstivādins. (Cf. V, 41.) It is interesting to see from the present proposition that the Sautrāntikas have postulated the existence of paramārtha-pudgalas. Then, what is the paramārtha-pudgala? It is the "real ātman, which is extremely subtle and cannot be comprehended." When we take this interpretation in the Shu-chi and also propositions XII, 1 and 3 into consideration, the paramārtha-pudgalas of the Sautrāntikas seem to be the same as the ekarasaskandha or the "subtle consciousness" which will become the substance which is subject to transmigration. The Vātsīputrīyas have entertained a similar idea. Cf. p. 53, note 4.

THE CONCLUDING VERSE OF THE ORIGINAL TEXT BY HSÜAN-CHWANG, THE TRANSLATOR.[1]

In detail many Sanskrit texts I've examined;
Again I translate a treatise on the schools.
Consistent the meanings and the text, mistakes none;
The wise should do their best to learn this.

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[1] We have the following preliminary remark to this verse in the [1]Shu-chi:—"After the translation of this treatise the master of the three piṭakas (or the three sets of sacred works) states (his) object in retranslating (this work)." The master of the tripiṭakas mentioned here is Hsüan-chwang, the preceptor of the commentator K'wei-chi.

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